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ABSTRACT
Revenue management is at the core of airline operations today; proprietary algo-
rithms and heuristics are used to determine prices and availability of tickets on an
almost-continuous basis. While initial developments in revenue management were mo-
tivated by industry practice, later developments overcoming fundamental omissions
from earlier models show significant improvement, despite their focus on relatively
esoteric aspects of the problem, and have limited potential for practical use due to
computational requirements. This dissertation attempts to address various modeling
and computational issues, introducing realistic choice-based demand revenue man-
agement models. In particular, this work introduces two optimization formulations
alongside a choice-based demand modeling framework, improving on the methods
that choice-based revenue management literature has created to date, by providing
sensible models for airline implementation.
The first model offers an alternative formulation to the traditional choice-based
revenue management problem presented in the literature, and provides substantial
gains in expected revenue while limiting the problems computational complexity.
Making assumptions on passenger demand, the Choice-based Mixed Integer Pro-
gram (CMIP) provides a significantly more compact formulation when compared to
other choice-based revenue management models, and consistently outperforms previ-
ous models.
Despite the prevalence of choice-based revenue management models in literature,
the assumptions made on purchasing behavior inhibit researchers to create models
that properly reflect passenger sensitivities to various ticket attributes, such as price,
number of stops, and flexibility options. This dissertation introduces a general frame-
work for airline choice-based demand modeling that takes into account various ticket
attributes in addition to price, providing a framework for revenue management mod-
i
els to relate airline companies product design strategies to the practice of revenue
management through decisions on ticket availability and price.
Finally, this dissertation introduces a mixed integer non-linear programming for-
mulation for airline revenue management that accommodates the possibility of simul-
taneously setting prices and availabilities on a network. Traditional revenue man-
agement models primarily focus on availability, only, forcing secondary models to
optimize prices. The Price-dynamic Choice-based Mixed Integer Program (PCMIP)
eliminates this two-step process, aligning passenger purchase behavior with revenue
management policies, and is shown to outperform previously developed models, pro-
viding a new frontier of research in airline revenue management.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978 airline carriers have had the
opportunity to control more aspects of their business. These decisions have become
more difficult as networks connections grow and technology expands with a goal of
providing a fully interconnected network of flights allowing passengers to fly virtually
anywhere in the world. The introduction of more advanced decision making mod-
els and supportive technology has assisted the airline industry with their expansion,
generating a necessity to optimally solve the decisions related to their operations.
Some of these decisions include airport selection, fleet requirements, pricing struc-
tures, collective agreements with other carriers, and allocation of space on a plane.
Although carriers have been solving these problems for decades with heuristics and
assumption-filled models, advances in technology allow for modeling approaches that
can improve the current methods and better represent the behavior airline demand
typically follows.
The two most important decisions an airline makes day-to-day are centered around
the pricing structure and ticket availability for customer purchase. The ticket price
and consumption of space when tickets are purchased have some of the largest impacts
on revenue gains when compared to other revenue earning practices, such as up-sale
opportunities and in-flight options. With the progression of network development, a
need for complex pricing models arose, leading the way to yield management. Yield
management, formally, was the process of estimating and anticipating customer de-
mand, utilizing these estimates to price tickets appropriately, assuming certain fixed
costs were in place. Over the years, yield management evolved into the more common
1
term used today: revenue management. Revenue management is at the core of airline
operations today; expensive software is utilized and proprietary algorithms alongside
heuristics are implemented to solve these difficult problems. In more advanced carri-
ers, revenue management is incorporated into many decisions including fleet and crew
assignment, emphasizing the importance of having a well-rounded revenue manage-
ment solution methodology.
1.1 Revenue Management
1.1.1 Revenue Management Framework
There is a fundamental framework that exists among the literature concerning
revenue management in the airline industry. We assume a network exists, consisting
of origins and destinations, with no variable costs of flying in or out of an origin or
destination. This assumption lets us optimize expected revenue rather than profit;
the costs of including an origin or destination into the network have been handled,
as well as the operational costs associated with flying. Between every origin and
destination is a leg in which a plane has already been assigned, implying the capacity
of the plane is known prior to solving a problem. Under these assumptions, we have a
capacitated network containing multiple legs with no cost implications. There may be
multiple paths between each origin and destination which consume space on multiple
legs, while each path typically has a value assigned to it known as a fare or price.
The combination of paths, fares, and flight schedule are represented as itineraries,
and are purchased as tickets. As the number of paths and fare options (often referred
to as fare classes) increase, the number of itineraries grows exceptionally fast. This is
a fundamental problem in revenue management as many papers direct their focus on
minimizing the number of itineraries to consider to make it possible for the industry
2
to solve this combinatorial problem.
The objective of revenue management is to determine the number of seats (allo-
cations) to sell at a particular fare to maximize the network revenue. This can be
done in many ways including protection levels, seat assignments, policy implementa-
tion, ticket availability, or pricing thresholds (often called bid prices). A protection
level is the number of seats which you “reserve” for your higher paying passengers.
For instance, if the expected demand for a higher paying passenger was D1 and the
fare for that passenger was R1, we can continue to accept passengers at a lower fare,
R2, only until the expected value of the higher paying passengers exceeds the lower
fare. Thus, when R2 ≥ R1P (D1 > x) is no longer true for a capacity x, it is ad-
vantageous to reject the lower fare passenger in favor of the probability a higher fare
passenger shows up. Rearranging this equation we can calculate protection levels for
the higher paying passengers as y1 = P
−1(R2/R1), which yields the number of seats
we should reserve for only the higher paying passengers. Once protection limits are
reached, lower fare classes are closed and all arrivals requesting the lower fare tickets
are rejected. This series of equations leads to one of the original models developed
for revenue management called Littlewood’s Rule (Littlewood, 2005), and laid the
groundwork for future revenue management models.
Seat assignments are the number of seats the airline is willing to reserve for each
fare class and can be determined from the protection levels, or vice versa. Once seats
in a particular fare class (sometimes called a bucket) are sold out, that fare class is
considered closed. Ideally, once a fare class is closed it is generally not re-opened as
it would net a lower revenue than waiting for a higher paying passenger, but due to
customer behavior there are instances where opening previously closed fare classes
could be advantageous. Seat assignments are nested in fare class, such that allocation
for the higher fare classes contain the sum of the allocations for the lower fare classes
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plus their protected seats. As an example, if I had two fares, high and low, and 10
seats on a plane, I would allow the entire plane to be sold at the high fare class.
However, I would lose money if I sold all the tickets to the lower fare class, so I would
put a cap on what they could buy, let’s say 5. This would equate to seat allocations
of 10 for the high fare class and 5 for the low fare class. Converting this to protection
limits, I would have a protection level of 5 for the high fare class since I’m only willing
to sell 5 seats to the lower fare class.
A policy, on the other hand, doesn’t explicitly state how many seats are to be sold
in any given fare class. It states for each itinerary in the system whether it is available
or not. This, in effect, will govern what fare classes are available for purchase at any
point in time. A bid price, on the other hand, is a hurdle rate associated with a given
capacity in the network. This price is generalized to be the marginal value of a single
seat for a leg. If a passenger requests a ticket below the bid price, we stand to make
more money by rejecting him and awaiting a new arrival. If the passenger requests a
ticket at or above the bid price, we will sell the ticket and consume the capacity along
the path selected. Effectively, bid prices determine which fare classes are available by
closing those whose marginal value is below the stated bid price. Implementing a bid
price is similar to that of a policy, as bid prices doesn’t explicitly state which seats
are available for each fare class. Bid prices are often represented as a vector of prices,
one for each leg, where flights with multiple legs are priced according to the sum of
their leg’s bid prices.
The final component of revenue management is the demand aspect. Revenue
management has become more complex over the years, but can be separated into two
categories: Independent Demand and Choice-Based Demand (Dependent Demand).
Independent demand refers to a system where the observed demand does not change
as a function of the options available. For instance, if a passenger was looking to
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book a specific flight at a fare of $250, this passenger, under the independent demand
assumption, would not care that an earlier flight might be available. This assumption
segregates the population into buckets with their requested path, as well as other
ticket attributes, and the fare associated with the path. This was the assumption
used for the majority of revenue management up until recently, when choice-based
modeling of demand became more prevalent. Choice-based demand refers to a system
where the observed demand is dependent on the itineraries and options available.
Given a set of choices, a passenger’s behavior is modeled by a set of probabilities
corresponding to selecting each one of these choices, assuming these choices coincide
with their preferred origin and destination and other ticket attributes. Aside from
the origin and destination, common ticket attributes like time of day, price, number
of stops, and refundability, play an important role in modeling passenger purchasing
behavior. The large number of origin-destination combinations with these ticket
attributes complicate the problem of revenue management greatly, as we now have to
consider what ticket attributes are included in a purchase, and how these attributes
effect our demand estimates. The independent demand assumption ignores the fact
that multiple choices exist and the role these attributes have on purchasing behavior,
whereas choice-based demand can take all of these effects into account.
1.1.2 Independent Demand Models
Revenue management optimization has been around since the early 1970’s. In
one of the first models, Littlewood formulated a single product problem (one leg), in
which he looked to determine the optimal number of seats to protect based on two
fares. He reduced the problem to a classic news vendor problem, in which we choose
to sell the lower fare class ticket only if the expected revenue of the higher fare class
ticket was lower. Applying the news vendor problem results, Littlewood developed an
5
equation for generating protection levels, which was later named Littlewood’s Rule
(Littlewood, 2005):
y∗1 = F
−1
(
1− R2
R1
)
. (1.1)
As previously discussed regarding protection limits, Littlewood’s rule calculated the
protection levels, y∗1, for the higher fare class based on the fares of the two fare
classes, namely, R1 and R2. This is often referred to as the first revenue management
model, and became the foundation for some of the more popular models. One of
these more popular models was developed by Peter Belobaba (Belobaba, 1989). His
model, the so-called Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model expanded on
Littlewood’s formulation to take into account more than two fare classes. In his
original model, EMSR-a, Belobaba makes comparisons between fare classes that are
adjacent to one another, utilizing Littlewood’s Rule. The model then aggregates
protection levels as you move up the fare classes, to create a set of protection levels
for all available fare classes (Belobaba, 1989). In his secondary model, EMSR-b, the
demand for higher fare classes is included in the calculations for lower fare classes,
as oppose to aggregating protection limits, and an average fare is considered when
adjacent comparisons are being made through Littlewood’s rule (Belobaba, 1992).
The final results of both EMSR-a and EMSR-b were a set of protection levels, or
booking limits, for each fare class on a given leg. Another model that expanded on
Littlewood’s original paper was that of Brumelle et al. (1990). In their model, they
took Littlewood’s formulation and introduced stochastic dependence for the demand
between fare classes. They then examined the full fare spillage (demand that is not
met due to seat limitations) and vertical shifts (the process by which demand shifts
from one fare class to another when their original fare class is not available) from the
lower valued, discount fare classes (Brumelle et al., 1990).
Since the EMSR methodology was simplistic and easy to solve, researchers began
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expanding on Belobaba’s original formulation and adapting it to other slightly more
complicated settings. In Williamson’s PhD dissertation, a method which prorates
revenue across legs in an itinerary containing at least one connection was introduced
(Williamson, 1992). This is an important concept, as revenue is determined by the
itinerary, not the value across each leg of that itinerary. This method allowed seat
allocations and protection limits to be calculated using the EMSR methodologies
while still having a more complex network of flights (Williamson, 1992). Another
model that stemmed from Littlewood’s rule and is very similar to the EMSR methods
was developed by Wollmer (1992). Instead of calculating protection levels, Wollmer
determines the critical value of seats for each fare class. This critical value is analogous
to the booking limitations determined by the EMSR methods.
Around the same time Belobaba was developing EMSR, Glover et al. (1982) devel-
oped one of the first network formulations to solve the RM problem. They modeled
the problem as a seat allocation network flow problem, and proceeded to solve it to
maximize profitability. The system bounds were determined by the demand for a
given leg and the capacity of the plane on that leg (Glover et al., 1982). This model
then led to other more complex models such as multicommodity flow problems (Dror
et al., 1988) and alternate network flow formulations which focused on shadow prices
(Simpson, 1989). Shortly after these network formulations began developing, associ-
ated linear programs were being developed to solve the network revenue management
problem. Curry (1990) developed a linear program which utilizes a piece-wise approx-
imation of the marginal seat revenue as an objective function. The model solved for
seat allocations directly and included origins and destinations which could be nested
within each other (Curry, 1990). A linear programming formulation originally inves-
tigated in Smith and Penn (1988) was later analyzed and formally documented by
Talluri and van Ryzin (1999), which became a popular method called the Random-
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ized Linear Program (RLP). In the RLP, a basic seat allocation deterministic linear
program was solved repetitively with randomized demand estimates from a known
distribution of demand. These solutions were then averaged to generate bid prices for
each leg within the system. This method of randomizing the demand generates more
realistic results and more reliable bid prices (Smith and Penn, 1988; Talluri and van
Ryzin, 1999).
Another large movement in revenue management came from American Airlines.
Smith et al. (1992) describes the optimization process they created for American
Airlines. This process, called Dynamic Inventory and Maintenance Optimizer (DI-
NAMO), was a segregated approach to solving many problems in their airline. DI-
NAMO split up the decisions to be made into three distinct sets: overbooking, dis-
count allocations, and traffic management. Using the optimal solutions of these indi-
vidual problems, DINAMO then found the optimal seat allocations for the network
(Smith et al., 1992). Other models took a different approach and focused on optimal
pricing policies to solve the RM problem. These pricing models varied, such as models
that determine optimal prices to offer products for (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1997),
models that select the duration of offering a known pricing point (Feng and Xiao,
2000b,a), and models that dictate when the price of a product should change (Feng
and Gallego, 2000). Jacobs et al. (2010) considered the relationship between pricing,
revenue management controls, and the scheduled capacity to create a statistic for eval-
uating the quality of an airline’s strategy called the “price balance statistic”, as well
as an algorithm to optimize the relationship between these decisions. Overall, these
models were different in how they solved the problem since they didn’t determine
actual allocations, only pricing policies. In addition to these pricing models, stochas-
tic formulations (Moller et al., 2007; Topaloglu, 2008; Erdelyi and Topaloglu, 2008;
Chen and de Mello, 2010b), relaxation methods (Kunnumkal and Topaloglu, 2010a;
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Topaloglu, 2009), and simulation models (Klein, 2007; Gosavi et al., 2007; van Ryzin
and Vulcano, 2008b) were also developed to handle the network revenue management
problem. In addition to these optimization models, earlier revenue management lit-
erature began focusing on dynamic programming (DP) formulations (Lee and Hersh,
1993; Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994; Subramanian et al., 1999; Liang, 1999; Lauten-
bacher and S. Stidham, 1999). These DP formulations would be the building blocks
of more complicated methods, leading up to some of the key revenue management
models we see today.
1.1.3 Choice-based Demand Models
As network formulations became more advanced, there was a growing need to
better estimate the demand over the network. Independent demand assumptions
failed to take into account the true purchasing behavior of passengers, resulting in
sub-optimal decisions from revenue management models. Eventually, choice-based
models made their way into revenue management, expanding on the ideas from the
last two decades to create more advanced models that yield better pricing and ticket
availability policies. These choice-based demand models, though, come at a cost of
computational complexity and can be difficult to implement into current systems.
Incorporation of passenger purchasing behavior based on ticket attributes and avail-
ability created complex demand models, requiring new revenue management models
for utilizing this type of demand modeling.
One of the first papers incorporating choice-based demand models into revenue
management was that of Gallego et al. (2004). In their paper, they developed a
linear program that solved the network revenue management problem with a general
discrete choice model. Their model took into account the probability that purchases
were made over a set of disjoint options, and then optimized how many passengers
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would be allowed on each of the legs within the network (Gallego et al., 2004). This
model would later be called the Choice-Based Deterministic Linear Program (CDLP),
and has become a benchmark model for revenue management solution methodologies.
In the same year, another important model was developed by Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004a). In their paper, they introduced a dynamic program that takes into account a
general choice-based demand model, as well as a solution methodology to combat the
curse of dimensionality common in dynamic programs. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a)
were the first to develop the concept of efficient sets, which limited the number of
possible solutions to be evaluated. Other formulations utilizing dynamic programs
were developed as well, including Markov decision processes (Zhang and Cooper,
2005, 2006; Secomandi, 2008; Zhang and Adelman, 2009) and solution methodologies
using both dynamic programming formulations and linear programming formulations
in conjunction with one another (Farias and van Roy, 2007; Adelman, 2007).
With these more complex and realistic models being developed, researchers began
evaluating solution methods and altering the formulations themselves to create more
robust and computationally efficient models. Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2008) made
an alternate version of the CDLP providing better bounds on the problem when policy
decisions were being used. Liu and van Ryzin (2008) redefined the original CDLP
model and developed an iterative approach to applying the bid prices from the CDLP
to solve a leg-level dynamic program. The results of their paper yielded functional
policy decisions that were both time and capacity dependent. Additionally, they
expanded on the notion of efficient sets, applying them to their formulation of the
CDLP. Following the development of the new CDLP, Bront et al. (2009) developed
a column generation algorithm, which efficiently solved the CDLP with non-disjoint
market segments. In their paper, they considered situations where market demand can
overlap, a situataion that can complicate choice probabilities. Their paper outlines
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the details on applying the column generation algorithm, alternate ways to solve
the sub problem, as well as mathematical tractability of their formulation. Talluri
(2011) creates a method for solving the CDLP as well, called the segment-based
deterministic concave-program (SDCP). His method is a relaxation of the CDLP,
and provides looser upper bounds to the original problem. Shortly later, the SDCP
was improved on by Meissner et al. (2013), in which they included constraints on the
product selections to create an extended-SDCP (ESDCP).
Many researchers focused on solving the dynamic programming formulations de-
veloped over the years. Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2010b) develop a dynamic pro-
gramming decomposition method that solves a single leg DP with revenue estimates
for each leg in an itinerary. These estimates are determined through an optimiza-
tion model that takes into account the probabilistic choice-based demand. In Huang
and Liang (2011), the authors develop their own dynamic programming formulation
that solves for seat control policies. Their solution method for their DP estimates the
value function of revenue for the problem and then solves the DP with a parametrized
function and a sampling methodology. Zhang (2011) developed a new method to
solve Talluri and van Ryzin’s dynamic programming formulation, in which his model
yielded tighter bounds on revenue than the decomposition and CDLP methods origi-
nally explored. Another method developed was that of Kunnumkal (2011), who took
a two step approach where the first step relaxed the flight leg capacity constraints via
Lagrangian relaxation, while the second step solves the problem with perfect informa-
tion, yielding a final solution that determines capacity dependent policies. Meissner
and Strauss (2012b) consider inventory sensitive bid prices, and developed a dynamic
programming approach of their own. Their model estimates the value function of the
Markov decision process and then solves for the bid prices appropriately.
Other models that have been developed under the choice-based assumptions range
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from heuristics to mixed integer programs. van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008a) develop
an optimization model that solves for nested protection levels. Their model assumes
a general choice-based demand model, which separates the choice model from the
optimization problem itself. Their results are computationally efficient, which implies
practical use in the airline industry. Chaneton and Vulcano (2011) convert the choice
model into a continuous demand estimate, in which they develop a sub gradient
algorithm to find the stationary point. Their model allows for partially accepted
itineraries, similar to that of Topaloglu (2009), and yields mixed results over the
CDLP. Chen and de Mello (2010a) develop an optimization model which allows the
customers to work their way up the fare classes. Each customer has a finite probability
of buying up the fare class buckets, creating a demand stream for a set of optimization
problems to solve. Gallego et al. (2011) introduce a generalized attraction model,
and show the relationship between their generalized attraction model and the more
specific independent demand and basic attraction models. Their model was developed
to overcome the complexity of the CDLP resulting in a sales-based linear program
(SBLP) which utilizes the previously introduced general attraction model. Since a
large majority of the research results in optimal bid prices, Meissner and Strauss
(2012a) develop a heuristic that improves on the initial bid prices from any model.
Their method covers general choice models, and shows revenue gains over available
alternatives with a low computational burden.
Meissner and Strauss (2010) also develop a mixed integer program where policy
decisions on restricted fare classes are determined simultaneously with pricing deci-
sions on unrestricted fare classes. This problem formulation looks at networks where
some fares are determined in advance (restricted), and others have a set of available
options (unrestricted). Kunnumkal (2011) develop a two-step method for the choice-
based revenue management problem. The first step of their method solves an MIP
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that selects the best policies, similar to that of the CDLP. The second step then
determines the bid prices based on the policies selected through an LP. This LP can
be randomized, similar to that of the RLP, and provides good solutions compared to
that of the CDLP. Meissner and Strauss (2011) also develop a mixed integer program,
under the assumption that there is weak market segmentation. Their model proves to
be computationally intractable, yet the authors provide solution methods that trade
off run time for computational accuracy.
1.1.4 Other Demand Models
Although independent demand and choice-based demand covers the vast majority
of revenue management literature available, there are other demand models that
have been used to produce solutions. Topaloglu (2009) uses Lagrangian relaxation to
determine bid prices that are dependent on both capacity and time. His model allows
for a single leg to be accepted out of a multi-leg itinerary, and then decomposes the
problem into a leg-level heuristic. He argues this makes it computationally tractable,
since the size of the problem is not constrained by the complexity of the network.
Dynamic programming decomposition methods also exist for other demand models,
including ones that solve for both overbooking and seat allocations (Erdelyi and
Topaloglu, 2010), as well as pricing decisions where demand is dependent on the prices
being offered (Erdelyi and Topaloglu, 2011). In Song et al. (2010), the authors build
a mixed integer linear program to solve the network revenue management problem.
Their model uses a stochastic estimation of demand through a linear approximation.
A step function is used to estimate the demand, which then allows them to evaluate
revenue as a uniform distribution. They found their MILP generated upper and
lower bounds on the original randomized linear program (Song et al., 2010). Another
model, created by Perakis and Roels (2010), uses the decision criterion of maximin
13
and minimax. They consider multiple control sets such as partitioned booking limits,
nested booking limits, and fixed bid prices, and then generate an optimal solution
based on the maximin and minimax criteria.
1.2 Contributions of this Dissertation
As airline revenue management has advanced from independent demand models
into more realistic dependent demand models, a gap has developed between aca-
demic research and industry implementation. Models found in the literature focus
on minimizing assumptions and properly modeling demand, while industry practice
is relegated to sub-optimal models due to airline network complexity, lack of ability
to change the methods by which they estimate demand, or lack of pragmatic solu-
tions. The goal of this dissertation is to reduce this gap, and introduce alternative
formulations that are both implementable for airline use and can progress airline RM
research into the next frontier.
My first contribution in this dissertation is a mathematical formulation for network
revenue management utilizing a MNL demand model. The formulation is substan-
tially less complex than traditional dependent demand RM models in the literature,
and consistently outperforms current industry practice. With numerous examples,
I show the flexibility of the formulation while highlighting the considerable gains in
computational complexity, eventually solving a large network example that is virtu-
ally unsolvable by one of academic literature’s best performing models in a reason-
able amount of time. The reduction of complexity paired with the performance of
the formulation provides an applicable model for airline implementation as well as a
foundation to build upon for future revenue management research.
My next contribution is centered around the MNL demand model framework
and proper implementation for airline revenue management. Traditional dependent
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demand revenue management models utilize static assumptions on pricing and ticket
preferences, creating demand estimates that are independent of revenue management
controls, despite changes in price and ticket attributes directly influenced by these
controls. I introduce an MNL framework for network RM that incorporates passenger
sensitivities to price and other important ticket attributes, creating a demand model
that properly responds to revenue management controls while addressing passenger
purchasing behavior. The framework is easily implemented as there are tools for
fitting these models based on sales data, resulting in demand estimates that reflect
true passenger behavior without assuming static prices or ticket attributes.
The final contribution in this dissertation incorporates the previous framework
into a choice-based mixed integer non-linear programming formulation for airline rev-
enue management. Building upon the complexity gains from the first formulation and
the dynamic nature of demand from the framework, I introduce a model that max-
imizes expected revenue by adjusting ticket availability and prices, simultaneously.
Different from other revenue management models, my second formulation can adjust
prices while accommodating changes in demand, and set ticket availability based on
different ticket attributes commonly seen in the airline industry. The flexibility of this
formulation leads to gains in expected revenue when compared to the first model, as
well as a post-RM pricing method. Despite the non-linear nature of this formulation,
the complexity gains and ease of solving this formulation make it possible for indus-
try implemented, as shown by large examples based on the Southwest Airlines ticket
model.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I in-
troduce a mixed integer programming model that incorporates choice-based demand,
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and compare it against the popular models in revenue management literature and
practice. The contents of this chapter was published in October 2014 in the Jour-
nal of Revenue and Pricing Management (doi:10.1057/rpm.2014.17), and has been
reproduced for my dissertation. Chapter 3 builds upon observations from Chap-
ter 2, focusing on formally defining the multinomial logit choice demand framework
for airline revenue management, integrating ticket attributes and price for passenger
preference. The framework lays the groundwork for airline specific demand models,
taking into account each airline’s ticket definitions and display structure to generate
unique passenger preference utilities. Chapter 4 utilizes the previous revenue man-
agement framework and builds upon Chapter 2’s mixed integer program to introduce
a price-dynamic choice-based mixed integer non-linear programming model for airline
revenue management. The price-dynamic model is able to simultaneously solve for
ticket availability and price, showing considerable gains versus other revenue manage-
ment models. Chapter 5 closes the dissertation, highlighting the results from previous
chapters and indicating a direction the field of revenue management can progress with
these contributions.
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Chapter 2
A CHOICE-BASED MIXED INTEGER PROGRAMMING FORMULATION FOR
THE NETWORK REVENUE PROBLEM
2.1 Introduction
From its inception, airlines have used Revenue Management (RM) techniques to
improve their revenue performance or yield by optimizing the passenger mix through
fare class seat availability or bid price hurdle rates. Both leg-based and Origin-
Destination (O&D)-based approaches have used a common assumption that the pas-
senger demand associated with a given flight or O&D path and fare class are known
and forecast independent of other options within the market. For example, demand
forecasts for full fare passengers on BOS-PHX-LAX are based on historical traffic
observations on that specific path and do not explicitly account for the passenger
demand associated with other paths in the market like BOS-ORD-LAX. In addition,
most RM approaches used in practice today assume that fare classes are mutually
exclusive of one another when optimizing seat allocations or bid prices.
These assumptions preclude the demand interactions between different routes,
fare classes and competition from other carriers in the same markets, and limit the
quality of the optimization results and controls. To remove the limitations of these
assumptions, the demand forecasts and optimization must consider the interactions
between the different fare classes and routes available to potential passengers at the
point of sale.
In this chapter, we propose a mixed integer programming formulation that explic-
itly incorporates the fare class and routing interactions using a MultiNomial Logit
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(MNL) choice model. This formulation, which we refer to as the Choice-based Mixed
Integer Program (CMIP), represents an alternative formulation to the Choice-based
Deterministic Linear Program (CDLP), as proposed by Liu and van Ryzin (2008).
The fundamental difference between the two formulations is that the one proposed
here considers individual market strategies as variable options rather than network
level strategies. CMIP shows similar revenue performance to the CDLP while enjoy-
ing significant reductions in the number of decision variables, which is shown to result
in significant computational advantages in the problem instances that we have tested.
CMIP is also shown to yield improvements over popular leg-based EMSR models and
O&D network-based models covered by the literature and used in practice.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
recent literature and developments associated with incorporating passenger choice
into the RM process, Section 2.3 presents the CMIP formulation, Section 2.4 solves
an illustrative example and compares performance to other models, Section 2.5 solves
larger examples and compares performance, and Section 2.6 highlights the conclusions
and potential future research directions.
2.2 Literature Review
Although many RM models have been developed over the past 30 years, the
following literature review focuses on the choice-based demand approaches that aim
to model consumer behavior more accurately for the network RM problem.
To provide a framework for choice-based modeling, we first present an overview
of some of the leg-and O&D-based methods available. Two leg-based independent
demand methods worth noting, however, are that of Littlewood’s 1972 paper (which
was later republished in 2005), and Belobaba (1989). Often, Littlewood (2005) is cited
as being one of the first models to solve the RM problem. His model determined
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the necessary protection limits by comparing two products’ expected demand and
fares. Littlewood (2005) proposed a rule, termed Littlewood’s Rule, which determines
protection levels for the higher fare classes. Belobaba (1989) expanded on Littlewood’s
research, and created the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) model. His first
model, EMSR-a, executed pair-wise comparisons to determine how many seats to
reserve for higher fare classes. The EMSR-a model could compare any number of
pairs, and would aggregate protection levels as it moved up the fare class buckets
(Belobaba, 1989). Later, Belobaba expanded on his own model, creating the EMSR-
b methodology. EMSR-b, instead of aggregating over protection levels, aggregates
the demand for higher paying passengers, and calculates a weighted fare for them
(Belobaba, 1992). This weighted fare is then used for a comparison, and protection
levels are calculated. For a more complete history of independent demand RM models,
we refer the reader to Weatherford and Ratliff (2010). These independent demand
models, like that of Littlewood (2005) and Belobaba (1989), were computationally
efficient, but they lack the network interactions and competitive effects present in
today’s complex airline markets. To this end, research moved towards choice-based
modeling techniques for solving the network RM problem.
Two of the first, and possibly most influential, papers in choice-based modeling
for network RM were Gallego et al. (2004), and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a). In
Gallego et al. (2004), the authors propose a linear program that solves the network
RM problem with a general discrete choice model. Using the probability of a purchase
as a parameter, the model determines the amount of a time that each set of policies,
defined by the itinerary and fare, is to be offered. This method maximizes the revenue
across the entire network, by selecting a subset of available policies, constrained by
the available space consumed on a leg (Gallego et al., 2004). This model is later
developed into the Choice-based Deterministic Linear Program (CDLP), and has
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become a benchmark for the testing of newer models in the field of network RM.
In particular, the CDLP determines the optimal amount of time to offer a set of
policies, S. This set S is comprised of open and closed policies for each O&D fare
class combination within the network.
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a) formulated the problem as a dynamic program,
which modeled the probabilities of different purchases using a general discrete choice
model, and determined which policy sets to offer based on the available capacity,
similar to the model in Gallego et al. (2004). Talluri and van Ryzin introduced the
concept of efficient sets, which allowed for search techniques to manage the complex
nature of the solution space. From this point on, research in choice-based RM has
gone in one of three directions: solution methodologies for the CDLP, approaches to
solve dynamic programming formulations, or formulations that are new altogether.
2.2.1 CDLP Solution Methodologies
In Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2008), the authors created an alternative form
of the CDLP, and obtained better results through the solution of the primal. Liu
and van Ryzin (2008) expanded on the original CDLP, and developed an iterative
approach by applying the bid prices generated from the CDLP to a leg-level decom-
position approach to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a)’s dynamic program. The results
of their method provided capacity and time-dependent bid prices, which are useful
for industry application. The authors also expanded on the notion of efficient sets,
and applied them to the CDLP, generating methods for solving this complex problem
(Liu and van Ryzin, 2008). Shortly thereafter, Bront et al. (2009) developed a column
generation algorithm to solve the CDLP, in the special case of having non-disjoint
markets. Their model considered situations where market demand can overlap, and
competition can arise between O&D’s as well as pricing options. The authors provide
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details on how to solve the column generation algorithm for the CDLP, as well as
provide two methods for solving the subproblem of determining which set to intro-
duce into the reduced primal problem (Bront et al., 2009). Talluri (2011) relaxed the
CDLP, and solved a Segment-based Deterministic Concave-Program (SDCP), which
provided looser upper bounds to the original problem. Following this relaxation,
Meissner et al. (2013) expanded on the model to include constraints on the product
selections, creating the extended-SDCP.
2.2.2 Approaches to Solve Dynamic Programming Formulations
Although Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a) provided one of the first models utiliz-
ing dynamic programming formulations for network RM, others also explored this
approach. Zhang and Cooper (2005) offered a different perspective, and created a
Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation for cases where multiple flights are be-
ing offered between O&D’s in short time spans. Later, Zhang and Cooper (2006)
developed an MDP model that allowed for substitution to take place between flights.
Although both of these MDP formulations could be solved via dynamic program-
ming, more efficient methods were found in the form of inventory-pooling (Zhang
and Cooper (2005)) and heuristics (Zhang and Cooper (2006)). Some models were
developed in conjunction with dynamic programs, like in Farias and van Roy (2007)
and Adelman (2007). In Farias and van Roy (2007), the authors model the network
RM problem as a dynamic program, and then solve it with a linear programming
approximation. Their model is unique, as it solves for the bid prices directly, rather
than producing policy-based decisions. Adelman (2007) utilized an affine approxima-
tion for the value function of his dynamic program. Similar to Farias and van Roy
(2007), his model determines the bid prices for the network, and generates a dynamic
set of bid prices. Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2010b) developed their own dynamic
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programming decomposition method, which solves the single-leg decomposition with
revenue estimates for each leg in an itinerary. The revenue estimates were generated
ahead of time through an optimization model utilizing the choice-based modeling
schema.
Some models shift the focus from policy decisions and generate solutions that
determine seat allocation policies. Huang and Liang (2011) developed a dynamic
programming formulation, which they solve by estimating the value function of the
dynamic program (DP) with a sampling technique. Their model solves for the seat
control policies, rather than open or closed fare class decisions. In Zhang (2011), the
authors proposed an alternative way to solve the dynamic programming formulation
of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a), and provided better bounds on the optimal solution
for the original problem. Kunnumkal (2011) took a different approach to solving the
dynamic program, and offered two approximation models for solving the choice-based
network RM. Lagrangian relaxations were done for both methods, one based on re-
laxing the flight leg capacities and the other based on perfect demand information.
His model generates capacity-dependent policies, similar to that of the original dy-
namic programming formulation (Kunnumkal, 2011). Another unique formulation is
found in Meissner and Strauss (2012b), in which they develop a dynamic program-
ming formulation that takes into account inventory sensitive bid prices. Their model
estimates the value function of an MDP to determine capacity-dependent bid prices.
2.2.3 Alternative Formulations
Other models different from the typical dynamic programming formulations and
CDLP were also developed. van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008a) developed an optimiza-
tion model that solves the choice model independently from the optimization model
itself, creating an easier and quicker solution methodology to the problem. Their
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model solves for nested protection levels, rather than policy or bid price optimization.
Chaneton and Vulcano (2011) sought to simplify the problem by changing the formu-
lation of the choice-based demand models. They estimate the choice-based demand
by applying a linear approximation to the demand, creating a continuous function
with a stationary point found using a sub-gradient algorithm. Their model allows for
partially accepted itineraries in which the passenger requests can be accepted on legs
within the itinerary, but not the entire itinerary itself (Chaneton and Vulcano, 2011).
This approach is similar to that of Topaloglu (2009), in which a bid price solution
methodology is developed by applying a leg-level decomposition approach. Chen and
de Mello (2010a) developed a formulation that modeled the buy-up behavior directly.
Their model allows for passengers to step up in fare classes if their desired fare class is
unavailable. From this buy up pattern, the authors were able to determine a demand
stream, which then was used to solve a set of optimization problems.
Gallego et al. (2011) introduced the generalized attraction model, which can be
applied to any demand input. The independent demand, as well as basic attraction
models, were found to be special cases of this generalized attraction model. They
develop their model to combat the complexity of the CDLP, resulting in a new for-
mulation known as the Sales Based Linear Program (SBLP). Another mathematical
model, in the form of a mixed integer program, was developed by Meissner and Strauss
(2010). Their model solved for both policy decisions on restricted fare classes (i.e., fare
classes in which discrete fares are determined in advance), as well as pricing decisions
on unrestricted fare classes (i.e., fare classes in which a continuous range of available
prices exist). Kunnumkal (2011) developed a two-step method for solving the net-
work RM problem. His method first determines which policies are optimal through
a choice-based mixed integer program, followed by a linear program that determines
the marginal value of seats. He argues that the linear program can be randomized,
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and provides good solutions compared to those obtained by the CDLP (Kunnumkal,
2011). Meissner and Strauss (2011) also developed a mixed integer program, under
the assumption that market segmentation is weak. This creates ambiguity in the de-
mand stream, and their model proved to be computationally intractable. The authors
provided alternative solution methods for solving their mixed integer program, citing
cases where shorter run times were more advantageous than computational accuracy.
In the following section, we present a new formulation that improves on the research
reviewed here.
2.3 Mathematical Model
We consider a network with legs l ∈ L, and containing multiple markets defined by
set J . A market j represents an O&D pair. There exists a set of policies, Ij, defined
for each market j ∈ J , where a policy i ∈ Ij is defined as a pair of itinerary and
fare class assignments. Since each market can have multiple itineraries (i.e., paths)
and fare classes, we define the set Kji that contains all defined fare class-itinerary
pairs for market j ∈ J and policy i ∈ Ij. The planning horizon associated with this
model can be viewed as the time to departure. We discretize time into periods and
denote the index set of time periods by T . Having defined the network parameters,
the parameters and decision variables for our mathematical formulation are formally
defined in Table 2.1.
As an example, consider the network given in Figure 1, which is the same example
used in Bront et al. (2009) and Liu and van Ryzin (2008). The network contains
three nodes and leg capacities of 10, 5 and 5 seats for legs 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Each leg represents a single flight, thus there are no parallel flights for this network.
Table 2.2 includes further data on this example; eight products were defined by what
the authors refer to as “O&D path” and fare class combinations.
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λt Number of customer requests for flights to the network in period t, t ∈ T
Pj Probability of an arrival for market j, j ∈ J
Sji Probability that a purchase is made for market j under policy i ∈ Ij
Pk|j,i Probability of a purchase on fare class-itinerary k ∈ Kji,
given purchase is made for market j under policy i ∈ Ij
Rk Revenue for a purchase on fare class-itin. k given policy i is used
Akl Binary parameter representing consumption of leg l for fare class-itin. k ∈ Kji
cl Capacity of leg l ∈ L available at the beginning of the planning horizon
Zjit Fraction of period t demand for market j served under policy i ∈ Ij
Xjit Binary decision variable to use policy i ∈ Ij for market j in period t ∈ T
Table 2.1: Table of Notations Used in CMIP
A
B
C
Leg 2
Figure 2.1: Illustrative Example: Three-leg Network
Table 2.3 includes data on customer preferences and utilities of the different prod-
ucts for each of the five segments. The preference vectors represent the utility that
the products in the consideration set provides for the segment. For example, segment
1 has a consideration set of {1, 5}, and a preference vector of (5, 8). This means that
the first segment has a utility of 5 for product 1 (i.e., the A-C itinerary with a cost
of $1200) and a utility of 8 for product 5 (i.e., the A-C itinerary with a cost of $800).
The larger utility value implies that customer segment 1 prefers the A-C itinerary
with a cost of $800 over the A-C itinerary with a cost of $1200. The no-purchase
utility corresponds to the option of not purchasing either product.
For our formulation, the network illustrated in Figure 1 would result in three mar-
kets, i.e., J = {AB,BC,AC}. Note that market AC contains two different itineraries,
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Origin-Dest.
Product Path Class Fare
1 A - C High $1200
2 A - B - C High $800
3 A - B High $500
4 B - C High $500
5 A - C Low $800
6 A - B - C Low $500
7 A - B Low $300
8 B - C Low $300
Table 2.2: O&D Paths and Fare Classes for the Illustrative Network Example (Liu
and van Ryzin, 2008)
Arrival Consideration Preference Utility of
Segment Rate Set Vector No Purchase
1 0.15 {1, 5} (5, 8) 2
2 0.15 {1, 2} (10, 6) 5
3 0.20 {5, 6} (8, 5) 2
4 0.25 {3, 7} (4, 8) 2
5 0.25 {4, 8} (6, 8) 2
Table 2.3: Data on Demand and Customer Preferences for the Illustrative Network
Example (Liu and van Ryzin, 2008)
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the direct path from A to C as well as the path containing the connection A-B-C.
For each market, j ∈ J , there is a set of available policies, Ij. Each policy lists the
available options, each defined by an itinerary and the fare classes. For instance, the
AC market has two competing paths, AC and ABC, thus the available policies for
the AC market would be all combinations of high and low fare class options, as well
as the possibility of closed itineraries.
When implementing policies in real life airline RM systems, certain fare classes are
nested within their lower fare class counterparts. For instance, the policy containing
AC high and AC low open simultaneously would be equivalent to opening only AC
low, since policy implementation is generally based on bid prices. That is not to
say the higher fare class is closed, just that there is no situation where an airline
would refuse a higher paying passenger just because the policy only defines AC low
as being open. This natural nesting among the fare classes eliminates the need to
separately define policies in which AC high and AC low are open simultaneously. The
elimination of these simultaneous policies, however, removes any buy up potential,
thus the model makes a conservative assumption that buy up is negligible.
Finally, the set Kji includes all fare class-itinerary pairs defined for market j under
policy i ∈ Ij. The first component, market, is defined by the available market set J .
The policy component is defined by the set of available policies Ij. The itinerary path
is determined by the structure of the network itself. The combination of appropriate
market-policy-itinerary path groupings generates the set K, which is referred to as
the fare class-itinerary. For the illustrative example, the values of these sets can be
seen in Table 2.4, in the fourth column.
We can now determine the values of our parameters λt, Pj, Akl, Rk, Pk|j,i and Sji
for the illustrative network example. For this example, we assume that the arrival
rate, or the number of unit demand arrivals per period, stays constant at the values
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listed under the column labeled “Arrival Rate” in Table 2.3 for each customer segment.
We actually use these values for λtPj for each market. From Table 2.3 the arrival rate
for market AC, for example, will be equal to the sum of the arrival rate values listed
for customer segments 1, 2, and 3, i.e., λtPAC = 0.50 customers for each time period.
Similarly, λtPAB = 0.25 and λtPBC = 0.25 for all t ∈ T . Note that in the example,
the time is scaled so that the total arrival rate, λt = 1.
The values of Akl can be determined by examining the network and fare class-
itineraries. If fare class-itinerary k ∈ Kji consumes space (i.e., 1 unit of capacity) on
leg l, then Akl is assigned a value of 1. Otherwise, Akl is assigned a value of zero.
Since Rk represents the revenue earned for fare class-itinerary k being purchased,
those values can be read directly from the pricing table.
The values for Pk|j,i were determined through conditioning. For instance, if the
policy available was AC High/ABC High, then a fraction of the purchases would
purchase the AC itinerary while others would purchase the ABC itinerary. Since we
are conditioning on the fact that a purchase was made, we merely need to determine
what fraction of passengers purchased the AC High option (or, “fare class-itinerary”)
and what fraction of passengers purchased the ABC High option. To do this, we must
first determine which customer segments, as defined by Table 2.3, prefer each of the
options. For the AC High option (defined as product 1), we can see that customer
segments 1 and 2 have utility values for this product (as defined by their consideration
sets). Likewise, for the ABC High option (defined as product 2), we can see that only
customer segment 2 has preference for this product.
We first calculate Sji, which denotes the probability of a purchase by an arriving
market j customer under policy i ∈ Ij. For the above example of policy AC High/ABC
High for the AC market, the probability of purchase by a market AC customer under
policy i ∈ Ij can be calculated as a weighted average of the purchase probabilities
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that can be calculated from the given utilities of the products available under the AC
High/ABC High policy, and that of no purchase. That is,
SAC,AC High/ABC High =
5
5 + 2
(
0.15
0.50
)
+
10 + 6
10 + 5 + 6
(
0.15
0.50
)
+ 0
(
0.20
0.50
)
= 0.443 ,
by using the given utilities and conditioning on the event that the AC customer is
from segment 1, 2 or 3, respectively.
Note that the utility values used above represent the respective eul terms used in
the MNL model. Essentially, the ratio 5/(5 + 2) can be rewritten in traditional MNL
format as e1.609/(e1.609 + e0.693), where the values of 1.609 and 0.639 would represent
the MNL utilities for the AC market for AC High and the no purchase option, re-
spectively. We use this simplified notation for ease of representation, following the
tradition set by previous papers in this area.
Then, the probability that the customer bought fare class-itinerary k, such that
k ∈ KAC,AC High/ABC High given that a purchase was made by an AC customer under
policy AC High/ABC High can be calculated by
PAC High|purchase under AC High/ABC High =
5
5+2
(
0.15
0.50
)
+ 10
10+5+6
(
0.15
0.50
)
0.443
= 0.806 .
Similarly, we can calculate
PABC High|purchase under AC High/ABC High =
6
10+5+6
(
0.15
0.50
)
0.443
= 0.194 ,
or, simply by observing that for this policy with two fare class-itinerary options,
PABC High|purchase under AC High/ABC High = 1− PAC High|purchase under AC High/ABC High .
Continuing similarly, we obtain the values in Table 2.4 for this illustrative example.
Note that in columns one through five, the table provides the markets (i.e., j ∈ J),
the policies defined for each market, (i.e., i ∈ Ij), the purchase probability for market
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j under each policy i ∈ Ij, (i.e., Sji values), the defined fare class-itineraries (i.e., set
Kji) for each market j under policy i ∈ Ij, and finally, the conditional probability
that the option given by a particular fare class-itinerary j ∈ Kji will be selected,
given that a purchase for market j was made under policy i ∈ Ij.
Finally, our formulation uses the following decision variables. Xjit represents the
binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the decision is to use policy i for market j
in period t, and Zjit represents the fraction of market j demand served under policy
i in period t. To expand on the variable Zjit, consider an example where, for a
given market policy i and five time periods, Zjit takes on values of (0, 0, 1, 1, 0.172).
This vector would represent the following set of decisions. For time periods 1 and 2,
policy i is not available and no demand for market j would be served under this policy.
During time periods 3 and 4, policy i is available, and any arriving demand for market
j would be served. Finally, during time period 5, policy i is available, but only 17.2%
of the potential demand should be served. Note that the term “served” here does
not necessarily mean that they will be purchasing a ticket; it basically means that
they get to consider the various options available to them for market j, under policy
i ∈ Ij. As a result of this consideration, they may or may not purchase a ticket on
market j. Using these two decisions variables, and the parameters previously defined,
we formulate the Choice-based Mixed Integer Program (CMIP) as follows.
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Fare Class-Itineraries
Market (Set J) Policies (Set Ij) Sji (Set Kji) Pk|ji
AB
AB High 0.667 AB High 1
AB Low 0.857 AB Low 1
BC
BC High 0.750 BC High 1
BC Low 0.875 BC Low 1
AC
AC High/ABC High 0.443
AC High 0.806
ABC High 0.194
AC High/ABC Low 0.761
AC High 0.556
ABC Low 0.444
AC Low/ABC High 0.809
AC Low 0.681
ABC High 0.319
AC Low/ABC Low 0.607
AC Low 0.773
ABC Low 0.227
AC High/ABC Closed 0.414
AC High 1
ABC Closed 0
AC Low/ABC Closed 0.580
AC Low 1
ABC Closed 0
AC Closed/ABC High 0.279
AC Closed 0
ABC High 1
AC Closed/ABC Low 0.347
AC Closed 0
ABC Low 1
Table 2.4: Set Definitions and Calculated Parameters for the Illustrative Example
Adapted from Liu and van Ryzin (2008)
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Maximize
∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
λtPj
∑
i∈Ij
Zjit Sji
∑
k∈Kji
RkPk|j,i (2.1)
Subject to: ∑
t∈T
∑
j∈J
∑
i∈Ij
∑
k∈Kji
λtPjZjitSjiPk|j,iAkl ≤ cl, for all l ∈ L, (2.2)∑
i∈Ij
Xjit ≤ 1 , for all j ∈ J, t ∈ T, (2.3)
Zjit ≤ Xjit , for all j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, t ∈ T, (2.4)
Zjit ∈ R+, Xjit ∈ {0, 1}, for all j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, t ∈ T. (2.5)
The objective function (2.1) represents the total expected revenue across all time
periods for the decision variable Zjit. The objective function can be broken into two
main components: the arrival rate of demand per market and the expected revenue
for a given policy. The first component, the arrival rate of demand per market, is the
product of the expected number of customer requests in period t, (i.e., λt) and the
probability that an arrival demands a ticket for market j, (i.e., Pj). This product,
λtPj, represents the expected number of arrivals in time period t ∈ T for market j.
The second component, the expected revenue obtained from market j under policy
i ∈ Ij, E[Rj(i)], assuming that customer preferences remain unchanged throughout
the planning horizon, can be calculated as follows.
E[Rj(i)] = (1− Sji) 0 + Sji E[Revenue | purchase in market j under policy i ∈ Ij ]
= Sji
∑
k∈Kji
RkPk|j,i , (2.6)
where Rk denotes the revenue from a sale on fare class-itinerary k ∈ Kji, Pk|j,i
denotes the conditional probability of a purchase on fare class-itinerary k ∈ Kji,
given a purchase for market j is made under policy i ∈ Ij, and finally, Sji is the
probability that a purchase for market j is made under policy i ∈ Ij.
Constraint set (2.2) ensures that the capacity constraints on the legs are not
violated. The continuous decision variable, Zjit, allows for the partial accommodation
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of demand, and facilitates the determination of bid price values for the flight leg, l ∈ L.
The purpose of a bid price is to represent the marginal value of an extra seat on a
given leg. In the event constraint set (2.2) is binding, we can increase the capacity of
a leg to determine what impact this increase would have on the objective function.
The value of variable Zjit could be increased a marginal amount, no greater than one,
if the current value is less than one. In the event Zjit was already at a value of one,
then the model could select a different Zjit to improve the objective function. This
would force the constraint to be binding, again, and the objective function, which
also contains the Zjit variable, would increase appropriately. This increase would be
analogous to the shadow price of a linear program, thus it can be used as the marginal
value of a seat on a given leg. The marginal value of a seat is then translated into
the bid price for the leg, and could be used for bid price based control policies.
One difference between our formulation and other formulations stems from the
fact that the other models account for all market combinations in the form of sets,
whereas CMIP combines policies for O&D markets to determine the overall policy
for the network. For instance, the CDLP selects which sets are optimal, while the
CMIP model selects, individually, which O&D fare class combinations optimize our
revenue. Since the CMIP focuses on a market-by-market level, the total number of
variables for the problem is greatly reduced, which results in reasonable solution times
for larger networks, as we show for a large network instance. As mentioned above,
the complexity of the network greatly impedes the quality of the solutions that one
can obtain from the CDLP formulation within a reasonable run time. Hence, having
fewer variables in the CMIP formulation allows for the modeling of larger networks
with solution times that are implementable for industry use.
To illustrate the magnitude of the difference in variables, consider the small net-
work that we considered earlier, depicted in Figure 1. In this network, for a single
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time period, the CMIP has a total of 24 variables and 18 constraints. The CDLP,
for the same scenario, has a total of 255 variables and 4 constraints. As we increase
the number of time periods, the CMIP increases in both variable and constraint to-
tals, while the CDLP does not. The advantage of the CMIP, however, is when the
complexity of the network is increased. Adding just one more node with respective
high and low fare classes and connections (assuming this node is independent of the
markets currently in the network), would only increase the CMIP to 28 variables
and 22 constraints. This same network for the CDLP formulation would have 16,383
variables and 5 constraints. The CDLP has a smaller constraint set, yet the variable
space is exponentially increasing as the complexity of the network is increased. The
CMIP has a much smaller variable space, and a reasonably sized constraint space.
As the complexity of the network is increased, the variable and constraint space does
not increase in an exponential fashion; the total number of variables for the CMIP,
however, would increase multiplicatively for each additional time period.
2.4 Solution of the Illustrative Example
We solved the CDLP and CMIP formulations for the example presented above (see
Figure 1), and implemented the obtained policy decisions in a simulation to compare
the performance of the two approaches. We used AMPL and Gurobi 5.0.1 to build
and solve the formulations. We assumed that buy-up did not happen, as there only
is a very small probability that a passenger will purchase a higher priced ticket if a
lower priced ticket is available.
We programmed the simulation in MATLAB following a traditional Monte Carlo
simulation approach. First, the simulation takes bid prices as the control, and gen-
erates the available fare classes in each time period. We assume a stationary arrival
rate of customers (I.e., λt = λ for every time period t ∈ T ) and generate exponential
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customer interarrival times with this rate. For each customer, the simulation model
generates the identity of the market that the customer is interested in purchasing, as
well as what, if anything, the customer purchases using Pj, Sji and Pk|ji in a relatively
standard random number generation scheme. In case of a purchase, the capacity of
the legs for the requested itinerary is reduced, and the total revenue is updated. We
ran the simulation for 2000 iterations for each of the network instances tested. This
simulation is used for all of the results following the illustrative example.
The solutions from the two formulations generated similar bid prices across the
majority of the tests. The average total revenue values obtained with the two ap-
proaches were also comparable. As seen from Table 2.5, the CDLP and CMIP reach
identical bid prices in every case except for T = 5 and λ = 5. Due to the nature
of this illustrative example, the leg AC only has pricing options of $800 and $1200.
Hence, having a bid price of $750 implies both pricing options are to be open. Note
that obtaining a bid price of $0 (which can be observed in the case of the CMIP for
T = 5 and λ = 5), would have the same effect as having a bid price of $750. This
implies the CDLP and the CMIP generate identical bid price control strategies across
all combinations for this example.
For the results presented in the last two columns of Table 2.5, the CMIP increased
expected revenue by an average of 2.72% when compared to the CDLP. Although
these models are similar, the way they handle expected traffic is different. The CDLP
uses the direct probability of purchases generated from the MNL choice model. The
CMIP uses the probability of purchases for a given fare class-itinerary, conditioned
on a purchase being made. These differences are subtle, yet impact the CDLP and
CMIP objective functions, so comparison on these values alone is insufficient. To this
end, we simulated the policy for the instance of λ = 5 and T = 5, to see whether
the differences between revenues would continue to hold. This problem instance was
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CMIP Bid Prices CDLP Bid Prices Obj. Fn. Obj. Fn.
λ T AB AC BC AB AC BC CMIP CDLP
1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $515 $497
1 5 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,577 $2,485
10 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $5,155 $4,971
1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,577 $2,485
5 5 $0 $0 $500 $0 $750 $500 $10,664 $10,064
10 $300 $1200 $500 $300 $1,200 $500 $13,168 $13,167
1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $5,155 $4,971
10 5 $300 $1,200 $500 $300 $1,200 $500 $13,168 $13,167
10 $500 $1,200 $500 $500 $1,200 $500 $13,500 $13,500
Table 2.5: Results from CMIP and CDLP Formulations
chosen since this was the only case where the bid prices differed between the two
models. We determined the 95% confidence intervals around the expected revenue
for both simulations. The CMIP resulted in an interval of ($6, 959, $10, 071), while
the CDLP resulted in an interval of ($6, 950, $10, 088). As expected, the results we
observed for the CMIP and CDLP were very close to one another. Based on the results
of the simulation, we conclude that, in this set of problem instances, the CDLP and
CMIP provide similar solutions, and can be used interchangeably.
2.4.1 Implementing the Solution
One advantage of the CMIP formulation is the fact that both the policy and bid
price controls are useful for industry application. The solution to the CMIP indicates
which policy should be offered for each market during a particular time period. In the
three-leg network problem instance, the solution would instruct, for instance, to open
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the high fare class for itinerary ABC during time periods 1, 2 and 3. Additionally,
it would indicate to open the low fare class for itinerary AB during time periods 1
and 2, while opening the high fare class for time period 3. A reservation system
could directly interpret this decision to open and close these particular fare classes,
following the guidance of the CMIP solution. The reservation system could then
generate cut offs for certain fare classes and calculate protection levels based on the
airline’s current system, if necessary.
An effective bid price control can be derived from the solution to this formulation
as well. Effectively, the lowest open fare class-itinerary on a leg, at optimality, reflects
the marginal value of that leg. In terms of right-hand side sensitivity, adding an
additional seat to this leg would increase the overall network revenue by the value of
that itinerary as long as the optimal basis of the integer solution does not change.
This marginal value is analogous to a bid price that can be used for inventory control.
Since both the policy and bid price controls from the CMIP are implementable, this
model could be utilized for either reservation system, as well as a reservation system
that utilizes both solutions for pricing and capacity controls.
2.4.2 Comparison to Other Network RM Methods
Two common models currently being used in the industry include a stochastic
network flow formulation and the EMSR-b model, discussed in the literature review.
The network flow formulation represents one approach commonly used and is a pop-
ular O&D RM strategy. The network formulation, as seen in Appendix A of Jacobs
et al. (2008), represents a stochastic passenger flow model, solved using a Lagrangian
relaxation approach with a sub-gradient algorithm. The network flow formulation
solves for the bid prices associated with each leg, and calculates the protection limit
for each fare class on each leg using Littlewood’s Rule.
37
The EMSR-b model represents a leg-based control strategy which estimates the
bid prices using protection limits based on Littlewood’s Rule. To account for the
connecting traffic between O&D pairs, the revenue of the connecting fare was prorated
and allocated to each leg in the O&D. The industry uses various versions of the
EMSR-b and network formulation, making these industry models a good technique
to compare against.
The EMSR-b model and the network formulation were solved for multiple passen-
ger demand scenarios. The results show, using simulations of nine combinations of λ
and T , that the CMIP performs better than both models. The CMIP outperforms
the EMSR-b by 11.82% in mean revenue over all of the nine cases given in Table 2.6.
A standard z-test on the difference of each set of means for the results shown in Table
2.6 illustrated that the differences in the expected revenue of all nine combinations
are statistically significant, with p-values less than 0.001.
In some situations the CMIP simulation resulted in larger confidence intervals, but
this is due to the highly segmented nature of fares. The difference between a sale and
no sale is at least $300 (in the case of the lowest fare for legs AB and BC), creating a
large gap between revenues among simulations, yielding large standard deviations in
relation to overall revenue. It is important to note, however, that as a larger amount
of demand enters the network, the width of the confidence intervals for the CMIP
reduces drastically; this is the exact opposite of the EMSR-b simulation, where the
confidence intervals become wider as more demand enters the network.
For the network formulation, the gains were slightly less since the network formu-
lation tends to perform better than the EMSR-b. The expected revenue showed an
average increase of 9.60% over the nine cases presented in Table 2.7. Similar to the
statistical tests of the EMSR-b, these nine cases show that the expected revenues are
significantly different between the CMIP and network formulation, with p-values less
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CMIP EMSR-b % Increase
λ T 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval Over Mean
1 ($0, $1,414) ($0, $903) 10.8
1 5 ($228, $4,468) ($1,175, $3,191) 7.0
10 ($1,891, $7,213) ($2,692, $5,430) 10.8
1 ($261, $4,465) ($1,175, $3,191) 7.7
5 5 ($6,959, $10,071) ($3,915, $9,663) 20.3
10 ($10,229, $12,199) ($7,834, $11,488) 13.8
1 ($1,891, $7,221) ($2,692, $5,430) 10.9
10 5 ($10,186, $12,220) ($5,164, $8,818) 13.8
10 ($13,174, $13,772) ($10,069, $13,799) 11.4
Table 2.6: Expected Revenue Confidence Intervals by Bid Pricing Controls Simula-
tion (CMIP vs. EMSR-b)
than 0.001. All three model simulations were run together, yet we chose to display the
ESMR-b and network formulation results separately for easier comparison. Similar to
the EMSR-b, the network formulation uses a segmented demand model for predicting
the expected number of passengers. This causes the network formulation to open up
the lower fare classes earlier than the CMIP does. Since the CMIP keeps the lower
fare classes closed for a longer period of time, a higher overall revenue is earned.
The results show a significant performance difference between the four tested net-
work RM models. Figure 2.2 illustrates the gains by each of the models as one
increases the total number of passengers introduced into the system over the entire
time horizon. At the lowest level of passenger demand, all four models behave sim-
ilarly: they sell to any passenger that shows up. At the highest level of passenger
demand, all the models again behave similarly: only sell to the highest paying pas-
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CMIP Network Formulation % Increase
λ T 95% Confidence Interval 95% Confidence Interval Over Mean
1 ($0, $1,414) ($0, $903) 10.8
1 5 ($228, $4,468) ($1,169, $3,203) 6.9
10 ($1,891, $7,213) ($2,659, $5,521) 10.2
1 ($261, $4,465) ($1,169, $3,203) 7.5
5 5 ($6,959, $10,071) ($3,949, $9,971) 19.3
10 ($10,229, $12,199) ($8,771, $12,517) 5.1
1 ($1,891, $7,221) ($2,659, $5,521) 10.2
10 5 ($10,186, $12,220) ($8,791, $12,537) 5.0
10 ($13,174, $13,772) ($10,069, $13,799) 11.4
Table 2.7: Expected Revenue Confidence Intervals by Bid Pricing Controls Simula-
tion (CMIP vs. Network Formulation)
sengers. However, as one moves from zero demand to a higher demand, the models
begin to deviate from one another. The two dominating curves, the CMIP and CDLP,
produces higher revenues compared to the EMSR-b and the network formulation. In
fact, as seen in Figure 2.2, the CMIP and CDLP perform quite similarly.
2.5 Additional Examples
2.5.1 Small Network Instance
In addition to running the model on the three leg network seen above, we also
tested it on another network given in Liu and van Ryzin (2008). This network,
depicted in Figure 2.3, is a small 22 product network, consisting of 7 legs.
The network contains a direct flight from A to B, with competition from A to B
through the hub, H. There are two flights from each of the direct legs between A, H,
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Figure 2.3: Small Network Instance - Adapted from Liu and van Ryzin (2008)
B, and C: an early flight and a later flight. The network instance data, including all
of the MNL choice parameters, can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix
for the reader’s convenience. The small network instance was ran for 1,000 time
periods, with λt equal to 0.91 for each time period. This would represent a total of
910 customers introduced into the network.
We ran our model, and compared the results to those given in Bront et al. (2009)
for the example in Liu and van Ryzin (2008), and saw that our model performed
similarly to the CDLP. Across the five tests, each for a different fraction of total
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network capacity, our model performed 9.0% better, on average, than the CDLP,
while still maintaining similar levels of network Load Factor (LF). The LF, defined
as the average across all legs of the ratio of seats taken to total capacity, represents
how many seats, on average, are consumed across the entire network. In addition
to comparing it to the CDLP, we also compared it to the model solved using the
independent demand assumption (referred to as the INDEP model) found in Bront
et al. (2009), in which a deterministic linear program is solved with demand values
generated under the assumption that all of the products are simultaneously open.
The first column of Table 2.8 indicates the percentage of the base capacity used for
both the model solution as well as the simulation. This value represents an increase
or decrease in the amount of capacity available, while maintaining the demand over
the time horizon. The table includes the expected revenues obtained by the CDLP
and CMIP solutions, as well as the percent increase they offer over the INDEP model.
The table entries for CDLP and INDEP come from the simulation results reported
in Bront et al. (2009). As the capacity in the network increases, the network load
factor should decrease, as the demand introduced into the network does not increase,
although the available space does. As seen in Table 2.8, the load factors decrease as
the amount of capacity increases for all of the models, as expected.
Percent of CMIP CDLP INDEP
Base Cap. Rev. Inc. (%) LF (%) Rev. Inc. (%) LF (%) Rev. LF (%)
60 $224,114 30.0 98.5 $207,890 20.6 91.3 $172,362 97.7
80 $278,241 36.0 92.1 $261,264 27.7 85.6 $204,572 94.6
100 $297,752 31.7 83.6 $277,738 22.9 80.8 $226,002 87.7
120 $315,832 29.5 77.0 $282,842 16.0 71.6 $243,930 82.5
140 $318,153 22.8 70.2 $285,417 10.2 62.0 $259,039 77.0
Table 2.8: Expected Revenues and Percent Increase Over INDEP (Small Network
Instance)
42
2.5.2 Large Network Instance
We finally use a large network instance with realistic aspects to further test the
performance of the CMIP. The network structure, as well as the revenue values asso-
ciated with each itinerary can be found in Jacobs et al. (2008). This network contains
48 legs, each with an initial capacity of 200 seats, joining 10 cities (see Figure 2.4).
Each leg represents a single flight. There are no parallel flights available in this net-
work. There are 178 itineraries, with three fare classes each, denoted as Y, M, and Q,
for the given itinerary. There are a total of 90 O&D markets, with markets containing
either one, two, or three possible paths between O&D. For a single time period, the
CMIP model has a total of 3,598 variables. Note that for this example, the CDLP
would result in a total of 2534− 1 (or, about 5.6E160) variables. The total number of
arrivals to the system was set to 9,750 for a single time period. A single time period
was used to see a representation of a solution for an entire booking horizon. The
MNL values associated with each choice were arbitrarily generated, as well as the
individual arrival probabilities per market. These values can be found in three tables
(Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5) given in the Appendix, and are separated by how many
competing itineraries existed between O&D, for easier classification. The preference
vectors in Table A.3 represent the utility of the three fare classes, Y, M, and Q. The
preference vectors in Table A.4 represent the utility of the three fare classes for each
of the two itineraries available for that market. The first three utility values refer to
the Y, M, and Q fare classes of the first itinerary, while the last three utility values
refer to the Y, M, and Q fare classes of the second itinerary. Similarly, Table A.5
displays the preference vectors for the three itineraries with respect to the Y, M, and
Q fare classes.
As indicated by the results given in Table 2.9, the time required to solve this
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Figure 2.4: Large Network Instance, Adapted from Jacobs et al. (2008)
model is quite reasonable. As the capacity becomes more constraining, the model
needs more time to find an optimal solution. However, it can still be solved in a
reasonable amount of time. Since the CDLP is expected to have a total of 5.6E120
variables, we did not program the decomposition approach presented in Bront et al.
(2009), as it would have proved to be computationally prohibitive.
In addition to the revenue and network LF, the available seat mile (ASM) and
revenue per available seat mile (RASM) are also reported. The ASM is calculated
by the number of seats available on a leg, multiplied by the distance traveled by the
flight on that leg, then summed for all flight legs. The RASM is the total expected
revenue divided by the ASM. This value is often used in the industry, and although
the values seen in the table come from a fabricated instance, the RASMs are in-line
with what is seen in industry practice.
2.5.3 Computational Complexity
Many of the existing RM approaches, such as the dynamic program proposed
in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a) generate an exponential number of solutions by
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Percent of CMIP
Base Capacity Revenue LF (%) ASM RASM Elapsed Time (sec.)
60 $1,018,043 82.2 6,380,160 $0.16 142.87
80 $1,146,655 78.5 8,506,880 $0.13 66.04
100 $1,231,055 70.6 10,633,600 $0.12 3.07
120 $1,283,682 62.6 12,760,320 $0.10 3.65
140 $1,322,589 55.2 14,887,040 $0.09 1.59
Table 2.9: Expected Values for the Large Network Instance
explicitly combining market policy strategies together across the network. This is
problematic for industry use, as networks and fare class buckets have grown to create
many itineraries. One example of this complexity issue is apparent in the CDLP’s so-
lution set, S. Since set S contains all the fare class and O&D controls for the network,
S is dependent on the network definition, including prices and control strategies. For
example, a small three node, four itinerary, two fare class network yields 255 decision
variables for the CDLP formulation. However, if we increase the complexity of the
network to four nodes, seven itineraries, and keep the two fare classes, the model has
a total of 16,383 decision variables. This number continues to grow exponentially
when any parameter of the network is increased, which can be seen in Table 2.10.
This table illustrates the growth in complexity of the CDLP versus that of the CMIP
for the previous examples. As one can see, the CMIP doesn’t increase in size as fast,
which would allow for consideration of being tractable for industry use.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Work
The proposed CMIP formulation uses an MNL model to explicitly model the
impact of network-wide offerings on the probability of purchase to better reflect cus-
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Number of Number of Variables
Network Instance Products CMIP CDLP
Three Leg Example 8 24 255
Small Network Example 22 116 4.2 x 106
Large Network Example 534 3598 5.6 x 10160
Table 2.10: Variable Complexity of CMIP and CDLP for a Single Time Period
tomer behavior. Using problem instances of varying size, we have shown that CMIP
outperforms both the EMSR-b and a basic network formulation. Another model used
as a benchmark for performance was the CDLP, which utilizes the same MNL model
to develop its probability of purchase but yields a solution that is somewhat difficult
to decipher and implement. The CMIP in comparison offers an easy interpretation
of its solution. The CMIP and CDLP performed similarly in both model solutions
and simulation. The advantage of the CMIP, however, is based on the model’s com-
plexity. The CMIP is much smaller in size and easier to solve in most cases. As the
network becomes more complex, the CMIP does not exponentially increase in size as
the CDLP does.
From a pragmatic perspective, the CMIP approach builds on the advantages of
previous models by addressing passenger choice in a computationally more efficient
manner. Future work includes full scale tests of the approach and calibration of the
passenger choice model needed to drive the optimization. Another aspect for future
research includes the consideration of non-stationary demand to incorporate variation
in the market demand over time. Other areas include expanding the model to handle
bookings of multiple passengers at once, and time dependent demand utilities and
pricing.
With the results from the examples and the possibility of many industry specific
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extensions, the CMIP looks promising for future research. The CMIP could improve
on the models currently being used by leading airline companies today as well as be
the groundwork for further development in the area of RM. Utilizing choice modeling
and mathematical programming, the choice-based mixed integer program successfully
optimizes the network RM problem for the airline industry. Further development of
this model could assist in changing the way the industry solves their network RM
problems.
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Chapter 3
A MULTINOMIAL LOGIT FRAMEWORK FOR AIRLINE TICKET
ATTRIBUTE AND PRICE SENSITIVITIES
3.1 Introduction
Airline revenue management (RM) research is typically divided into two cate-
gories: independent and dependent demand models (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
Independent demand models, originally formulated in the mid 70’s, assume demand
for tickets can be segregated by price ranges, called fare classes, and that the proba-
bility of purchase is independent of which tickets are available at the time of purchase.
Dependent demand models for airline RM, on the other hand, assume demand for
tickets is dependent on what is offered at the time of purchase, and account for fare
class competition within similar origin-destination combinations through utility-based
choice models. Outclassed by fewer assumptions and a better representation of pas-
senger purchasing behavior, independent demand models have been virtually replaced
by dependent demand models in academic research. Despite the shift towards depen-
dent demand in academic research, many industry applications still utilize models
based on independent demand assumptions (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004b).
Most dependent demand RM models utilize static assumptions on purchasing
utilities and probabilities of purchase, failing to account for the diverse nature of pur-
chasing behavior present in today’s competitive airline industry. These RM models,
mostly centered around linear and dynamic programming techniques, fail to address
the details of the demand models and their impact on the solutions set forth by
the RM methodology. These RM models make assumptions on purchasing behavior,
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such as static pricing options and known utilities, without considering the truly dy-
namic nature of airline ticket purchases. In this chapter, we introduce a framework
for airline revenue management demand modeling, incorporating multinomial logit
(MNL) choice integrated with price and ticket attribute sensitivities. This frame-
work removes the static assumptions traditional dependent demand research makes
on airline networks, and directly incorporates important attributes passengers focus
on when making purchasing decisions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we formally
introduce the multinomial logit choice model and discuss how RM addresses ticket
utility. In Section 3.3, we highlight the diversity of ticket attributes present in today’s
airline networks and discuss the importance of pricing decisions in RM. Section 3.4
introduces the MNL framework incorporating price and ticket attributes, providing
examples of potential application on a real network. Section 3.5 reiterates the im-
portance of including price and ticket attributes in RM decision making, highlighting
the direction our framework can move RM research.
3.2 Multinomial Logit Choice Model
Multinomial logit choice models utilize a ratio of predicted values, often called
utilities, to determine the likelihood of purchases given a set of available options.
More specifically, multinomial logit models determine the probability of selecting a
particular option out of a set of alternative options by a ratio of exponential terms
in a logistic equation. The set of alternative options, θ, can be indexed 1 to M , such
that m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M} represents a particular option. For all m ∈ θ, we can then
model the probability an arbitrarily chosen person will select a particular option m
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as
P (y = m|θ) = e
xm′β∑M
m=1 e
xm′β
, ∀ m ∈ θ, (3.1)
where xm is a vector of attributes for option m and β is a vector of sensitivities for
each attribute present in any option. We are interested in modeling N attributes,
thus β = (β1, β2, . . . , βN), where each element of β refers to the sensitivity of an
arbitrarily chosen person for that attribute. Although not explicitly modeled here, a
no- purchase option is often included to account for the probability that no purchase
is made. This option can be incorporated by introducing a utility value for not
purchasing any option, which is called v0. In this case, the probability that option m
is selected becomes
P (y = m|θ) = e
xm′β
M∑
i=1
exi′β + v0
, ∀ m ∈ θ. (3.2)
This method of incorporating the no-purchase option provides freedom pertaining to
the probability no option is selected, since v0 could be set to any value that fits the
data.
Airlines have created their own unique product classifications to market tickets to
the general public. These different products are made up of distinct ticket attributes,
and play a role in how passengers choose to purchase tickets. For our purposes, the
model expressed in Equation 3.1 is characterized by these ticket attributes including,
price, time of day, path from origin to destination, and number of connections. Due
to the wide array of product classifications, a useful MNL model would have to
incorporate all relevant ticket attributes into the equation, creating a detailed demand
forecast based on each airline’s product classification.
Fitting these models can be computationally difficult, but methods exist for de-
termining the values of β based on sales data. Currently, the best method for fitting
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these models is a two-step parameter estimation technique developed by Newman
et al. (2014), which utilizes a log-likelihood expectation maximization technique with
linear separability. Their method efficiently finds the parameters for the utility model,
in addition to a no-purchase utility, resulting in a practical application of choice-based
demand modeling for the revenue management. Traditional methods, like the expec-
tation maximization and log-likelihood maximization techniques found in Talluri and
van Ryzin (2004a) also work, but can be computationally prohibitive, making it dif-
ficult for airline’s to implement for practical use.
When it comes to MNL choice models, revenue management literature has taken
a simpler approach to the problem by reducing the complexity of the MNL equation.
The exponential values, exm
′β, are interpreted as product utilities, where these util-
ities become the parameters for nearly all dependent demand revenue management
models. These revenue management models reduce the complex nature of the MNL
equation, assuming the form of the equation is known, by reducing the problem into
a ratio of utilities of the form
Pm =
um
M∑
i=1
ui + v0
, ∀ m ∈ θ, (3.3)
where um represents the utility for product m, v0 represents the no-purchase utility,
and Pm represents the probability of purchase for product m (Talluri and van Ryzin,
2004a; Gallego et al., 2004; Bront et al., 2009). The assumption that allows for this
simplification of the MNL model deals with static prices and fare class offerings: each
fare class has a price that cannot be changed and each origin-destination path can have
multiple fare classes. With these assumptions, the static-utility models predicting
passenger behavior are accurate, resulting in implied prices based on ticket offering
decisions.
Due to this simplification, though, most choice-based revenue management models
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in existence are unable to solve for price and ticket availability, despite the impact
these decisions have on passenger choice, especially pertaining to those attributes with
the biggest effect (such as price). Under the static environment, revenue management
models make no attempt at balancing price alongside ticket attributes, leaving a gap
between true purchasing behavior and modeled purchasing behavior. Consequently,
the resulting bid prices established by revenue management models based on these
static-utility assumptions fail to take into account the impact of price on passenger
preference, despite being the primary mechanism for pricing in the airline industry.
3.3 Current Airline Implementation of Ticket Attributes and Pricing
As previously mentioned, every airline has established its own product classifica-
tion, as seen by the wide array of ticket displays. Based on these ticket displays, a
ticket is made up of the product classification and specific flight information. While
mostly a marketing decision, these product classifications have a large impact on the
way passengers purchase tickets, implying the attributes included in each product
should play a role in how the MNL model is characterized. Thus, identifying the at-
tributes associated with the products, and subsequently including these attributes into
our MNL model, would lead to a fine-tuned choice-based demand model, eventually
leading to better ticket availability and pricing decisions under a RM methodology.
We can compare major airlines and their ticket displays side-by-side, and see
the wide array of products passengers have to consider when purchasing a ticket.
Despite providing the same fundamental service, a flight from an origin to a desti-
nation, American Airlines (AA) (Table 3.1) appears to have more products than its
competitor, Delta Airlines (DA) (Table 3.2), with American Airlines offering seven
different products compared to that of Delta Airline’s three. These products, made
up of different attributes, segments their demand in a way each airline has decided
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upon. American Airlines spreads out the attributes by offering products with flexi-
bility versus non-flexible attributes, and offers more product options differentiated by
refundability. Delta Airlines, on the other hand, categorizes their products by cabin,
separating out the basic economy from the Main Cabin, eventually leading to first
class. The fundamental service, a flight from an origin to a destination, is the same,
despite the varying products offered by each airline.
The differences in attribute selection for products are even more pronounced if
we compare AA to Southwest Airlines (Table 3.3) or Jet Blue (Table 3.4). South-
west Airlines and Jet Blue have fewer product classifications, while still providing the
same flight options. Southwest Airlines focuses on product classifications based on
attributes as opposed they have deemed important for each demand segment, while
Jet Blue has taken a simplistic approach by offering only two products. All of the
products offered by these airlines are made up of different ticket attributes, like re-
fundability and number of free bags, and impact the purchasing behavior of potential
passengers. Despite this impact, dependent demand RM models fail to address the
different attributes for each product, and adhere to their static utility models, creating
a gap between literature and implementation.
Lowest Fare Refundable Business/First
Ticket
Choice First Choice
Fully First
First
First
Attribute Flexible Flexible Flexible
Refundable No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Transferable No Same Day Yes Yes Yes Same Day Yes
Priority Check-in No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Priority Boarding No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Free Bags 0 3 0 2 3 3 3
Bonus Miles No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 3.1: American Airlines Product Attributes (American Airlines, 2016)
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Ticket Basic Main First/
Attribute Economy Cabin Business
Refundable No With Fee With Fee
Transferable No With Fee With Fee
Priority Boarding No Yes Yes
Seat Assignments At Check-in At Purchase At Purchase
Loyalty Program Benefits No Yes Yes
Upgraded Food Options No No Yes
Table 3.2: Delta Airlines Product Attributes (Delta Airlines, 2016)
Ticket Wanna Get
Anytime
Business
Attribute Away Select
Refundable No Yes Yes
Transferable With Fees Yes Yes
Priority Boarding No No Yes
Priority Security Lane No No Yes
Loyalty Miles Regular Bonus Bonus
Free Bags 2 2 2
Complementary Drinks No No Yes
Table 3.3: Southwest Airlines Product Attributes (Southwest Airlines, 2016)
Ticket Lowest Refundable
Refundable No Yes
Transferable With Fees Yes
Priority Boarding With Fees With Fees
Free Bags 1 1
Table 3.4: Jet Blue Product Attributes (Jet Blue Airlines, 2016)
Since demand for airline tickets comes from the general population, it is apparent
that demand for a specific ticket comes from a common customer pool, indifferent
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of airline. Although some airlines have frequent fliers, passengers typically focus on
the price of a ticket before other attributes, including the airline of choice. Thus,
each airline should be generating a unique choice-based demand model based-off of
their own ticket display, as these ticket displays define the attributes assigned to
each product. To do this, a general choice-modeling framework incorporating ticket
attributes and price must be developed.
3.4 MNL for Ticket Attributes and Pricing
To incorporate ticket attributes and price into the multinomial logit choice model,
we consider a network of airports connected with legs l ∈ L, and multiple demand
markets defined by the set J , such that a market j ∈ J is defined by an origin and
destination combination. Each customer is assigned to an origin-destination market,
j, determined by a probability λj, where each customer arrives from a common de-
mand pool with an overall arrival rate per time period of γt. For each market j, we
have a super-set of ticket availability matrices which we refer to as Ij. This super-set
is made up of multiple ticket availability matrices, i ∈ Ij, where i represents a single
ticket matrix availability for market j. For each ticket availability matrix i, we have
an offer set of available tickets, Kji, such that k ∈ Kji represents a ticket in ticket
availability matrix i for origin-destination market j.
To better explain this set notation, consider the example for the American Airlines
flights from PHX to JFK, seen in Figure 3.1. We would define the set of legs, L, as
{PHX-JFK,PHX-DFW,DFW-JFK,PHX-CLT,CLT-JFK}, as these are the only legs
present in this example. The market, j, defined by the origin-destination combination,
would be PHX-JFK. For this example, there would only be one market, so J would
be made up of one element. Figure 3.1 depicts one ticket availability matrix; the
available tickets are offered at a price, and the unavailable tickets are indicated by
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Figure 3.1: American Airlines Example Offer Set for PHX to JFK (American Air-
lines, 2015)
“Not Available”. Note that in this example one can construct 224 − 1 different ticket
availability matrices, that is, i ∈ Ij, where Ij = {1, 2, . . . , 224 − 1}, but most of these
are invalid for revenue management applications. Nesting of ticket products would
have to be preserved, so ticket availability matrices that have products like “Coach
Non-Refundable” available while making products like “Coach Flexible” unavailable
would be dismissed. Nesting of ticket products greatly reduces the number of ticket
availability matrices, while preventing bizarre combinations airlines refuse to offer.
Each flight would have a total of seven distinct nested product offerings, resulting
in a total of 67 = 279, 936 ticket availability matrices, compared to the 224 − 1 =
16, 777, 216 ticket availability matrices without nesting.
To see an alternative ticket availability matrix, note that copying the set of ticket
availability displayed in Figure 3.1 and replacing Flight 425’s Coach Non-refundable
ticket to “Not Available” would produce a unique alternative ticket availability matrix
that preserves the nesting of ticket options. Traditional revenue management models
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focus on optimizing the availability of these tickets, thus we denote the tickets listed
in i as the set Kji, where k ∈ Kji indicates a specific ticket, such as Flight 622, Coach
Flexible. From the ticket display in Figure 3.1, we can see that a ticket could be
defined by the intersection of a flight and product, and that there are a total of 24
tickets, some of which are not available. Thus, each ticket is made up of a combination
of product attributes, as well as flight attributes.
With these definitions, we can incorporate price and other ticket attributes into
the MNL model previously discussed. To do this, we must break down the MNL
model by characterizing the regression component of our MNL, namely, x′nβ, into
components more fitting for airline revenue management. As previously discussed,
price is an important component to revenue management, thus separating price and
its sensitivity from the remainder of the regression equation would create a model
that can be used to solve for price directly, while considering the dynamic nature of
purchasing behavior.
We can define a predicted response for ticket k as αk, that represents the overall
desire to purchase ticket k based on the various attributes. Under this definition, αk
can be characterized as
αk = Ykβp + x
′
kβ, ∀ k ∈ Kji, (3.4)
where βp is the sensitivity to price for a ticket and Yk is the price for ticket k. Similar
to the MNL definition in Equation 3.1, xk is a vector of attributes associated with
ticket k, but without price, and β is a vector of sensitivities for these attributes, but
without price. Based on Figure 3.1, if the two attributes we were concerned with
were “Refundable” and “Number of Stops”, xk = (1, 0) for the “Coach Refundable”,
Flight 425 ticket since that ticket is refundable and has no stops. Conversely, the
“Coach Non-refundable” ticket for Flights 1336 and 64 would yield an xk = (0, 1)
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since that ticket is non-refundable and has a stop. Although this is a small example,
any ticket attributes could be incorporated into xk in this manner. These ticket
attributes could be departure time, number of stops, or travel time, in addition to the
ticket attributes characterized by American Airline’s Coach Non-Refundable, Coach
Refundable, Business Non-Refundable, and Business Refundable products.
To compare this to the static-utility MNL format, we can define uk as the utility
of ticket k, evaluated as
uk = e
αk , ∀ k ∈ Kji. (3.5)
As opposed to the static utility model, uk has dependency on ticket price and at-
tributes, thus any revenue management model utilizing these utilities must dynami-
cally determine the utilities while solving for ticket price and availability.
Implementation of this model is rather straight forward, and we can utilize it to
determine probabilities of purchase for any demand component. We can calculate the
probability a customer from market j will purchase a ticket in the ticket availability
matrix i, Pji, as
Pji =
∑
k∈Kji uk∑
k∈Kji uk + vj
, ∀j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, (3.6)
where vj is the no-purchase utility for origin-destination market j. Since the MNL
model deals with availability when determining purchase probabilities, the probability
a ticket is purchased is directly related to what tickets are available at that time.
Based on a given ticket availability matrix i, we can also calculate the probability a
customer purchased ticket k as
Qk|ji =
uk∑
k∈Kji uk + vj
(
1
Pji
)
, ∀ j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, k ∈ Kji. (3.7)
This value, Qk|ji, could then be used for a revenue management model that takes
price and ticket attributes into account when determining ticket availability based
solely on ticket purchase probabilities, rather than ticket utilities. Since Qk|ji is
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dependent on price, as well as other attributes, the relationship between ticket price
and purchase probability is accounted for, as opposed to the static utilities of previous
revenue management techniques.
3.4.1 Implementation of MNL Framework
We can implement this framework and display its usefulness with an example of
two competing airlines. Suppose we have two flights from PHX to JFK for each airline,
American Airlines and Delta Airlines, with product definitions, ticket attributes, and
pricing seen in Table 3.5. Under static utility models, AA and DA would expect
similar utilities for the purchase of each ticket, since they are offering similar products:
a ticket from PHX to JFK at similar times. These similar utilities would result in
similar probabilities of purchase, under the static utility models, which should result
in similar revenue management policies.
Airline Departure Time Number of Stops Ticket Purchase Options & Price
AA 9:00 AM 0
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
$250 $325
AA 4:30 PM 1
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
$265 $340
DA 9:15 AM 0
Basic Economy Main Cabin
$235 $340
DA 5:00 PM 1
Basic Economy Main Cabin
$270 $335
Table 3.5: Ticket Options for PHX to JFK
In reality, though, the ticket offerings for each airline are different, due to the
different product classifications each airline has taken. The Lowest Fare - Choice
product for AA contains no special ticket attributes, similar to the Basic Economy
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product of DA, whereas the Refundable - Choice product contains a mixture of ticket
attributes like Refundable and Transferable, similar to the Main Cabin product of
DA. There are differences, though, between the products of each airline, and these
differences could impact the probability of purchase. We can use the MNL framework
described above to generate utilities dependent on ticket attributes and price based
on a given set of sensitivities, taking into account these different product classification
schemes. For instance, consider the attribute sensitivities seen in Table 3.6, which
were entirely fabricated.
Using these sensitivities for both airlines and the market population, we can gen-
erate utilities for each ticket for both AA and DA based on our MNL framework,
seen in Table 3.7, and compare each airline’s probabilities of purchase assuming all
four tickets are being offered for each airline (Table 3.8). In this example, we assume
the utility for no-purchase, that is a passenger choosing not to purchase a ticket, is
zero. This implies that when a passenger shows up to purchase a ticket, a purchase
will always be made. Since each airline would develop their demand models indepen-
dently of one another and the probability of no-purchase is zero, the probabilities of
purchase within each airline should sum to one.
As Table 3.8 suggests, the probabilities of purchase for each airline are substan-
tially different despite offering similar ticket options. AA’s demand is somewhat
evenly distributed between the four options, with the later flight Lowest Fare - Choice
product yielding the smallest probability of purchase. DA’s demand heavily favors
the Main Cabin product, primarily due to the priority boarding and seat assignments
at purchase, with more than 10 times the probability of purchasing these Main Cabin
products versus their Basic Economy counterparts.
Since the majority of revenue management models utilize these probabilities of
purchase, implementation of the MNL framework suggested here would generate
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Ticket Attribute Attribute Sensitivity
Departure Times
00:00 - 06:00 +1.5
06:01 - 12:00 +2.0
12:01 - 18:00 +1.7
18:01 - 24:00 -0.2
Ticket Changes
Transferable (Free) +0.60
Transferable (With Fee) +0.25
Refundable +2.1
Day of Flight
Priority Check-in +0.50
Priority Boarding +0.75
Number of Free Bags +0.50 per bag
Loyalty Program Perks +0.25
Other Attributes
Seat Assignment (At check-in) +0.0
Seat Assignment (At purchase) +2.1
Number of Stops -0.5 per stop
Ticket Price -0.01 per $
Table 3.6: Ticket Attributes and Passenger Sensitivities
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Airline Departure Time Number of Stops Ticket Options & Utility
AA 9:00 AM 0
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
4.95 4.71
AA 4:30 PM 1
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
2.59 3.49
DA 9:15 AM 0
Basic Economy Main Cabin
0.70 14.15
DA 5:00 PM 1
Basic Economy Main Cabin
0.45 9.03
Table 3.7: Calculated Ticket Utilities for PHX to JFK
Airline Departure Time Number of Stops Ticket Options & Purchase Probability
AA 9:00 AM 0
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
0.31 0.30
AA 4:30 PM 1
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
0.16 0.22
DA 9:15 AM 0
Basic Economy Main Cabin
0.03 0.58
DA 5:00 PM 1
Basic Economy Main Cabin
0.02 0.37
Table 3.8: The Probabilities of Purchase Implied by the Utilities Given in Table 3.7
unique ticket availability and pricing solutions for AA and DA, whereas the static
utility models currently implemented would result in similar ticket availability and
pricing for each airline. The differing attributes for each product and inherent at-
tributes within each ticket create unique purchase probabilities that our framework
can determine, without over-complicating the MNL demand model and tailoring it
to an individual airline’s use. These purchase probabilities can then be fed into a
revenue management model, leading to unique policies for each airline.
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3.4.2 Solving for RM Policies Considering Ticket Attributes
In this section, we demonstrate the impact of using a carefully constructed MNL
model that more accurately reflects customer preferences. To do this, we use the
utilities developed in the previous section to solve the Choice-based Mixed Integer
Program (CMIP) from Chapter 2. Solving the CMIP for both AA and DA, separately,
will highlight the impact these differing utilities and ticket attributes have on the
revenue management controls, which ultimately impact expected revenue.
We assume each itinerary (four tickets for each airline) only has a single seat
available, and a total of five potential passengers are arriving (γt = 5) in a single time
unit (T = 1). Since each airline has two flight options, this means there is a total of
two seats available per airline when a passenger shows up to purchase a ticket. The
earlier flight for each airline has no stops, as indicated by Table 3.9, while the later
flights have a single stop. We only consider a single seat on each of these flights to
represent the immediate decision an airline would have to make for a set of potential
passengers. To this end, we solve the CMIP and simulate the results in the same
fashion as Chapter 2.
Since we are only concerned with the PHX-JFK market, the connecting flight
implied by the single stop for the later flights and its competitive demand is ignored.
Although this example is simple, it will allow us to show the impact different revenue
management controls can have on identical demand streams considering we have
different utilities for each airline, as opposed to traditional static-utility based revenue
management models. The results from the CMIP model are summarized below in
Table 3.9, in a manner the airline industry would typically use.
Table 3.7 makes it readily apparent that the price and attributes included in a
ticket can play a large role in the distribution of utilities, whereas Table 3.9 reinforces
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Airline Departure Time Number of Stops Ticket Options & Purchase Probability
AA 9:00 AM 0
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
Not Available $325
AA 4:30 PM 1
Lowest Fare - Choice Refundable - Choice
Not Available $340
DA 9:15 AM 0
Basic Economy Main Cabin
Not Available $340
DA 5:00 PM 1
Basic Economy Main Cabin
$270 $335
Table 3.9: Ticket Availability for PHX to JFK Tickets Based on CMIP Solution
this impact by demonstrating the differing revenue management policies employed
by each airline. Under the utilities in Table 3.7, AA earns an expected revenue of
$577 for their two seats, and chooses to close the lower priced tickets for each of their
flights. DA earns an expected revenue of $562 for their two seats, slightly less than
their AA counterpart, while choosing to close only one ticket option, leaving the other
three options open for purchase. Although there is a difference in expected revenue, a
total of 2.5%, the important piece of this result is the different policies. An identical
demand stream was used for each airline, yet, due to the attributes included in each
product and ticket, their policies are substantially different. These differences would
play a huge role in revenue generation, and would only be compounded with a larger
network.
3.5 Conclusion
The use of dependent demand models is clearly the direction revenue manage-
ment should continue to move, but the assumptions of static utility models prevent
RM practitioners from properly modeling purchase behavior, producing sub-optimal
64
ticket availability and pricing decisions. We have introduced an MNL framework
that incorporates ticket attributes, including price and other ticket options, better
representing the true purchase behavior of customers and opening the door for future
revenue management models to incorporate better estimates of ticket utilities.
By directly incorporating price and common ticket attributes into the MNL frame-
work, our framework allows for RM models based off of responsive demand models to
be developed, hopefully leading to RM models that can manage both ticket pricing
as well as ticket availability. These two decisions, pricing and ticket availability, are
the crux of an airline’s revenue management system, but are often solved separately
due to the complex nature of purchasing behavior. This framework gives researchers
and practitioners of RM an opportunity to formulate RM models with more accurate
demand predictions while taking into account all ticket attributes designated by the
airline, as well as the products classified by the airline’s ticket display. The flexibility
of regression equations in the MNL framework allows each airline to generate their
own utility models based on their products, generating a unique demand stream for
optimization.
Additional applications of this framework, outside of RM, could be focused around
product definitions. Each airline has chosen attributes to generate their product
classifications, but don’t necessarily consider how these decisions impact revenue.
Utilizing this framework, a model could be developed that determines which attributes
to incorporate into a product definition, while considering purchase behavior based
on these attributes. A model of this type would bridge the gap between marketing
decisions and revenue management, fueled by the MNL framework suggested here.
The next step for RM is implementing this framework into a model that can
effectively handle both ticket availability and pricing decisions, while dynamically
determining demand based on these decisions. Incorporating the nature of passenger
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preference based on price and other ticket attributes directly into the RM model allows
for better demand estimates and the resulting controls airlines use for ticket display
and pricing. Additionally, this MNL framework could be used as a marketing tool,
generating demand estimates for different assignments of ticket attributes to products.
One could generate probabilities of purchase to determine the distribution of demand
based on different attributes, selecting the product classification that maximizes either
revenue or overall market share.
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Chapter 4
ADDRESSING TICKET ATTRIBUTE AND PRICE SENSITIVITIES IN
CHOICE-BASED REVENUE MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
In general, airline Revenue Management (RM) is centered around the control of
inventory by focusing on ticket availability or seat protection levels. In traditional
RM, important factors such as price are incorporated by implementing “fare class
buckets”, representing subsets of the market willing to purchase at a range of prices.
To address the complex nature of purchasing behavior, practitioners of RM have
increased the number of fare classes for each ticket type in an attempt to capture the
widest range of potential purchases. This proliferation of fare class buckets has created
an overly-complex environment, forcing the industry to take sub-optimal approaches
in managing their inventory levels.
In this chapter, we introduce a new model that eliminates the need for fare classes
within product classification, and addresses the nature by which customers purchase
tickets. By manipulating prices while simultaneously assigning availability, our model
is able to incorporate customer sensitivities to common ticket attributes, such as price
and travel perks, while maximizing revenue in a choice-based demand setting. Con-
trary to other choice-based demand RM models, our dynamic-pricing model doesn’t
rely on complex fare class structures, and can set prices explicitly without the added
complexity of the current fare class system. Our results indicate that price is an
important factor governing purchasing behavior, and that traditional RM models
aren’t satisfactory in modeling this sensitivity with fare classes, and thus generate
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sub-optimal solutions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we provide a
brief literature review centered around choice-based models to create the framework
of traditional RM, with some emphasis given to the process of pricing products. In
Section 4.3 we introduce the Price-Dynamic Choice-Based Mixed Integer Program
(PCMIP) alongside the demand model definition and problem framework. In Section
4.4, we solve the PCMIP on problem instances of varying size and complexity, and
compare them against the Choice-based Mixed Integer Program found in Chapter 2.
Section 4.5 contains a short summary of our work, conclusions drawn from the results,
and some insight into the future of pricing and its importance within RM.
4.2 Literature Review
Revenue management is not a new field of research by any stretch of the imagi-
nation. Older models, focused around independent demand assumptions, have been
developed and used for decades and built the framework we now use to further ad-
vance the field. Our research, although developed on the backbone of original RM
research, is primarily focused on choice-based demand and the subsequent pricing of
tickets, thus the literature review will be focused around these principles.
4.2.1 Revenue Management Models
Some of the groundbreaking work completed in choice-based revenue management
is found in Gallego et al. (2004) and Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a). In Gallego et al.
(2004), the authors consider a network of flexible products, under both independent
and dependent demand models, and introduce a choice-based deterministic linear pro-
gram (CDLP) that closely approximates the stochastic optimization problem. Their
linear program is easily solvable under independent demand assumptions, and they
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provide a framework for column generation under the more complicated dependent
demand formulation (Gallego et al., 2004). Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a) take a
different approach and introduce a dynamic programming formulation that incor-
porates a general discrete choice model while determining optimal offer sets. The
authors present an analysis of the efficient frontier, a subset of ordered policies for
which all other policies are sub-optimal, in a single leg environment. Due to the
difficult nature of parameterizing choice-models, Talluri and van Ryzin (2004a) also
develop an expectation maximization technique for fitting the demand model, given
information from a single firm.
Following the work of Gallego et al. (2004), Liu and van Ryzin (2008) expand on
the linear programming formulation and investigate the effects of increased network
complexity and the scaling of demand and capacity. The authors extend the previous
notion of efficient sets into a network framework, and offer a heuristic to convert the
static CDLP solution into a dynamic policy, solidifying its presence in the literature.
Bront et al. (2009) also introduce a means to solve the CDLP by constructing a column
generation algorithm under disjoint demand assumptions. Their column generation
algorithm provides a strong approximation to the dynamic program found in Talluri
and van Ryzin (2004a), while efficiently providing a means of solving the complex
dependent demand version of the CDLP found in Gallego et al. (2004). Due to the size
of the CDLP, Gallego et al. (2011) introduce a sales-based linear program that reduces
the number of variables under a general attraction model, while still converging to
the same expected revenue as that of the CDLP. Similarly, Clough et al. (2014) offer
an alternative formulation in the form of a mixed integer program. Clough et al.
(2014) consider a multinomial logit choice model in an airline network setting, and
assume market demand in which origins and destinations are separate can be solved
independently. Their model, the Choice-based Mixed Integer Program (CMIP), offers
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a smaller solution space under these assumptions, and maintains revenue performance
compared to the CDLP and traditional airline control mechanisms.
4.2.2 Dynamic Pricing Models
Dynamic pricing in a choice-based environment is a relatively new area of research
within RM. Prior to choice-based demand models being in the spotlight, some research
had focused on the importance of pricing, as seen in Jacobs et al. (2010), where
the authors investigate the relationship between pricing and revenue management
controls. Jacobs et al. (2010) consider the impact capacity has on the dynamic pricing
problem, creating a “price balance statistic” used for evaluating the quality of a
strategy and finding the optimal mix of pricing, scheduled capacity, and RM controls.
Choice-based dynamic pricing research has taken a different approach. Aydin and
Ryan (2000) consider a retail setting where consumers choose products based on a
pre-defined selection and pricing setup. The authors examine multiple environments
including the introduction of new products with associated pricing and the selection
of a pre-selected set of product and price options. Zhang and Cooper (2009) introduce
a Markov decision process to address dynamic pricing in an MNL environment. They
consider multiple substitutable flights in a single O&D market, and show their model
is intractable for realistic settings. In a similar approach, Dong et al. (2009) develop
a dynamic programming formulation in a retail environment. They consider an en-
vironment with a long lead time and short selling environment, where the retailer
must determine both inventory and pricing. More recently, Zhang and Lu (2013)
introduce a dynamic programming formulation for dynamic pricing and offer a non-
linear programming approximation approach. They compare their methods against
both static pricing models and other choice-based demand models, concluding that
dynamic pricing could have substantial gains versus their static counterparts.
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We believe these dynamic pricing models have only touched the surface of what
we can achieve with pricing and revenue optimization. In the following section, we
introduce a model that builds upon the previous literature, incorporating choice-based
demand and price sensitivities directly into a price-dynamic revenue management
model.
4.3 Model Formulation
Similar to the previous chapter, we consider a network of airports connected with
legs l ∈ L, and multiple demand markets defined by set J , such that a market j ∈ J
is defined by an origin and destination combination. Customers arrive to the system
in multiple time periods, indexed 1 to T , with a rate of γt, t = (1, 2, . . . , T ). These
customers are subsequently assigned to a market j, where λj refers to the probability
a passenger is assigned to market j. For each market j, there is a super-set of policies
defining ticket availability, Ij, where i ∈ Ij represents a specific matrix of ticket
availability for market j, similar to Chapter 3. For each ticket availability matrix i,
there is an offer set of available tickets, Kji, such that k ∈ Kji represents a ticket in
ticket availability matrix i for origin-destination market j.
Since price is of concern, we must consider the possibility that prices can change
with time. In Equation (3.6), time has no bearing on the probabilities of purchase.
We can incorporate the time component into our MNL probabilities by including the
possibility for prices to change in different times units. All other ticket attributes
would remain the same, so the only adjustment that needs to be made is to index
price by both time and ticket k, resulting in overall ticket sensitivities dependent on
ticket attributes, price, and time period, characterized as
αkt = Yktβp + x
′
kβ, ∀ k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.1)
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where Ykt represents the price for ticket k in time period t, and βp, xk, and β have
the same meaning as in Chapter 3. Since αkt now has a time component, the utilities
for each product would also have a time component, as seen in Equation (4.2).
ukt = e
αkt , ∀ k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.2)
Under this setup, we can modify the probabilities defined in Chapter 3 to incor-
porate time periods, resulting in the probability a purchase is made in market j in
ticket availability matrix i in time period t, as
Pjit =
∑
k∈Kji ukt∑
k∈Kji ukt + vj
, ∀ j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.3)
and the probability a passenger purchases ticket k in time period t, as
Qkt|ji =
ukt∑
k∈Kji ukt + vj
(
1
Pjit
)
, ∀ j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.4)
These probabilities will allow us to incorporate price and ticket attribute sensitivities
directly into a revenue management model. Building upon the complexity gains
of the CMIP, we introduce the Price-dynamic Choice-based Mixed Integer Program
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(PCMIP):
Maximize
∑
t∈T
γt
∑
j∈J
λj
∑
i∈Ij
Pjit
∑
k∈Kji
Ykt Qkt|ji (4.5)
Subject to:∑
t∈T
γt
∑
j∈J
λj
∑
i∈Ij
Pjit
∑
k∈Kji
Qkt|jiAkl ≤ cl, for all l ∈ L, (4.6)
∑
i∈Ij
Xjit ≤ 1 , for all j ∈ J, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.7)
Pjit =
∑
k∈Kji ukt∑
k∈Kji ukt + vj
, for all j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.8)
Qkt|ji =
ukt∑
k∈Kji ukt + vj
(
1
Pjit
)
,
for all j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.9)
LBk ≤ Ykt ≤ UBk, for all k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.10)
Xjit ∈ {0, 1}, for all j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.11)
There are two decision variables for the PCMIP. Xjit represents the binary decision
to select ticket availability matrix i for origin-destination market j in time period t,
which allows any ticket k ∈ Kji to be purchased. Ykt represents the price for ticket
k in time period t, thus the model can manipulate Ykt directly to reach capacity as
opposed to opening and closing a set of fare classes, as often seen in traditional RM
models. With these decision variables, the PCMIP will select a ticket availability
matrix as well as assign the prices to each available ticket in that matrix.
The objective function, given in Equation (4.5), represents the expected revenue
under the decision variable Ykt, taking into account the probability a ticket purchase
is made, determined by Pjit and Qkt|ji. Constraint set (4.6) bounds the expected
demand to that of the capacity on a leg, cl. Constraint set (4.7) ensures the model
can only select one ticket availability matrix of the super-set Ij. Constraint sets
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(4.8) and (4.9) define Pjit and Qkt|ji, based on Equations (4.3) and (4.4), respectively.
Constraint set (4.10) establishes lower and upper bounds on the pricing decision for
each ticket, while constraint set (4.11) defines the binary restriction for Xjit.
The PCMIP is unique when compared to other choice-based revenue management
models previously developed. First, it determines the ticket availability matrix to be
used for any time period, while simultaneously setting ticket prices. Compared to
other revenue management models, such as the CMIP, the PCMIP has flexibility in
pricing instead of being limited to a static price. The PCMIP eliminates the need
for a two-step optimization process by combining the decisions of ticket availability
and pricing into a single, concise model. Secondly, similar to the CMIP, the PCMIP
reduces the number of ticket availability matrices to consider when compared to other
choice-based revenue management models by separating origin-destination markets
that are independent of one another. Although airline networks are large due to a
highly connected network, the PCMIP is able to manage these complex networks
under this independent market assumption.
Computational complexity, though, is a hurdle that needs to be addressed. As
modeled, the PCMIP is a mixed integer non-linear program (MINLP), which can
be extremely difficult to solve. Fortunately, the structure of this problem leads to a
relatively easy solution with standard branch-and-cut algorithms. The structure of
the PCMIP, similar to the of the CMIP, only needs to consider a single ticket avail-
ability set in each market in an optimal solution. The selection between a mutually
exclusive set, like that of the super set of policies Ij, is quick to solve on its own,
resulting in a search for optimal prices. In a worst case scenario, an algorithm could
consider all ticket availability matrices i ∈ Ij, and then determine the optimal prices
given that availability set. Once these values have been determined, the algorithm
would simply pick the availability set for each market j that maximizes the total
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expected revenue. Realistically, though, branch-and-cut algorithms would be able to
set the ticket availability and prices in a traditional manner, as the selection of ticket
availability matrices are mutually exclusive. Thus, implementation of this model is
still feasible, with additional work needed on the design of an algorithm.
4.4 Computational Results
To test the efficacy and quality of the PCMIP formulation, we have constructed
four examples with varying parameters. The first example is based on the parallel
flight network seen in Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Bront et al. (2009), and will
focus on how the PCMIP behaves compared to the CMIP when the only behavioral
factors are price and time of day preference. The second example, common among
many RM papers, is the familiar three leg network seen in Liu and van Ryzin (2008).
We compare the PCMIP to the CMIP under many fare class options, illustrating
the importance of price optimization over fare class selection. The third example is
also based on networks seen in Liu and van Ryzin (2008) and Bront et al. (2009).
We compare the PCMIP to the CMIP in a hub-and-spoke network under preferences
associated with the Southwest Airlines business model. We consider many fare class
options when evaluating the CMIP, and show the continuous price options of the
PCMIP are superior to that of the CMIP under multiple fare class options. The final
example is an expanded version of the large network example seen in Liu and van
Ryzin (2008). We consider a slightly larger hub-and-spoke network, with added direct
flights for competition in addition to time of day preference. In all cases, the policies
of the PCMIP and CMIP are simulated in a traditional Monte Carlo simulation of
1000 runs, where the passengers arrive according to a Poisson arrival process, and
each passenger considers a ticket out of the ticket availability matrix.
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4.4.1 Parallel Flights Example: Time of Day Effects
In this example (Figure 4.1), we have a single origin and destination with three
flights representing an early (Leg 1), mid-day (Leg 2), and late (Leg 3) set of flights.
Each flight leg has its own capacity, with the early flight having 30 seats available, the
mid-day flight having 50 seats available, and the late flight having 40 seats available.
We tested two preference scenarios in this network; one where price is the only factor
and one where price and time of day (ToD) are factors. In both cases, the sensitivity
to price was set to βp = −0.002, representing a negative utility to price. When ToD is
included as a factor, we put preference on the early flight, and used the mid-day flight
as a reference. Thus, in the case where ToD and price are the factors that influence
purchasing behavior, we reach a regression model of the form
αkt = −0.002Ykt + ILeg 1 + 0.5ILeg 3 ,∀k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.12)
where ILeg i represents a 0/1 selection of Leg i. In the case where ToD is not included,
implying price is the only concern for purchase behavior, we have a regression model
of the form
αkt = −0.002Ykt,∀k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. (4.13)
Figure 4.1: Parallel Flight Network - Adapted from Liu and van Ryzin (2008)
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In each scenario, we tested the network for five time units (T = 5), with γ =
(6, 12, 24, 48, 96), for a total of 186 customers introduced to the network. The no-
purchase utility, vj, was set to be 0.5 for all markets. Similar to the example in Liu
and van Ryzin (2008), each flight leg has two fare classes, High and Low, and the
bounds on the fares can be seen in Table 4.1. These bounds were generated such
that the median of the upper and lower bound match the original prices found in
Liu and van Ryzin’s example. Under these conditions, we solved the PCMIP for
the two preference scenarios, and compared the results to that of the CMIP. As
the results from Chapter 2 suggest, the CMIP does as well or better than other
models, thus if the PCMIP is able to consistently do better than the CMIP, it follows
that the PCMIP will consistently do better than other models. Additionally, to see
the efficacy of optimal pricing while selecting ticket availability, we needed a similar
model to highlight the increase. Since the PCMIP is an extension of the CMIP and
the ticket availability sets are coded in a similar fashion, comparison of these two
models would be sufficient. On its own, the CMIP doesn’t have the opportunity to
set prices directly, so we set the prices for each fare class to the original prices given
by Liu and van Ryzin (2008), and used these values to determine ticket availability
from the perspective of the CMIP.
The first scenario, with price being the only factor, converged to the solution
shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, for each of the models. The prices of each ticket on
each leg are given, as these represent both the availability of a ticket and the price
at which it is sold. The PCMIP is able to select its own pricing policy, whereas the
CMIP must select the prices given to it.
The simulation of the solutions from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 resulted in the PCMIP
consistently outperforming the CMIP, as displayed in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.2. The
PCMIP yielded a 6.4% increase in revenue overall, while maintaining a similar network
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Leg & Fare Class Lower Bound Original Price Upper Bound
Early High $600 $800 $1000
Early Low $200 $400 $599
Mid-day High $800 $1000 $1200
Mid-day Low $300 $500 $700
Late High $400 $600 $800
Late Low $100 $250 $399
Table 4.1: Bounds and Original Prices for Parallel Network
Table 4.2: PCMIP Solution - No
ToD Pref.
Time
Early Mid-day Late
Period
1 $945 $945 $800
2 $945 $945 $800
3 $945 $945 $800
4 $945 $945 $800
5 $945 $945 $800
Table 4.3: CMIP Solution - No ToD Pref.
Time
Early Mid-day Late
Period
1 Sold Out $1000 $600
2 Sold Out $1000 Sold Out
3 $800 $500 Sold Out
4 $800 $1000 $600
5 $800 $1000 $600
load factor (PCMIP 78% versus CMIP 82%) and traffic. Since the PCMIP is free to
select price, and thus less constrained than the CMIP, the higher revenue gains were
expected, and the PCMIP dominated the CMIP in cumulative revenue over the five
time periods.
The second scenario for this network, where price and time of day preferences
were considered, yielded a considerably more dynamic solution, as seen in Tables 4.5
and 4.6. Now that price isn’t the only factor to consider, the PCMIP must balance
the sensitivity to price along with the time of day preferences, resulting in a more
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Time PCMIP CMIP
Period Rev. Traffic Rev. Traffic
1 $2,627 2.96 $1,997 2.76
2 $4,896 5.52 $2,346 2.35
3 $10,236 11.53 $7,459 12.30
4 $20,883 23.55 $19,623 26.24
5 $41,375 46.54 $38,902 51.05
Total $80,016 90.10 $70,327 94.70
Table 4.4: Expected Revenue and Traffic per Time Period of Simulated Policies (No
ToD Preference)
 
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Revenue per Time Period of Simulated Policies (No ToD
Preference)
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complex pricing structure. The obtained prices were simulated, and the PCMIP
outperformed the CMIP by 13.8%, while managing to achieve a higher load factor
of 94% versus that of the CMIP’s 86% (see Table 4.7 and Figure 4.3). It is worth
noting that the “bump” in the cumulative revenue (Figure 4.3) at time period 3 stems
from the difference in solutions. The PCMIP favors closing the early and late flights
in anticipation of future demand, whereas the CMIP only closes the early flight.
Ultimately, though, the PCMIP’s solution yields higher revenue and dominates the
CMIP solution in cumulative revenue for all time periods, similar to when price was
the only consideration.
Table 4.5: PCMIP Solution - With
ToD Pref.
Time
Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 3
Period
1 $1000 $608 Sold Out
2 $1000 $589 $800
3 Sold Out $700 Sold Out
4 Sold Out $666 $800
5 $1000 $800 $800
Table 4.6: CMIP Solution - With ToD
Pref.
Time
Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 3
Period
1 $800 $500 Sold Out
2 Sold Out $500 $600
3 Sold Out $1000 $600
4 Sold Out $1000 Sold Out
5 $800 $500 $600
This example showed that, in the simplest of cases, the PCMIP’s ability to select
price in addition to availability outperforms the static-price version of the problem,
as solved by the CMIP. Under the conditions of the two scenarios, the PCMIP’s
flexibility dominated the expected revenue of the CMIP while maintaining comparable
load factors. Even in situations where the policies were greatly different, as seen in
time period 3 of the second scenario, the cumulative revenue of the PCMIP never
fell below that of the CMIP, suggesting the PCMIP is better equipped to handle the
necessary decisions in a parallel network of this type.
80
Time PCMIP CMIP
Period Rev. Traffic Rev. Traffic
1 $2,782 3.36 $2,601 3.83
2 $6,491 8.08 $3,884 6.97
3 $6,816 9.74 $8,809 12.85
4 $22,001 29.70 $10,059 10.06
5 $53,266 60.65 $43,895 68.09
Total $91,356 111.52 $69,248 101.79
Table 4.7: Expected Revenue and Traffic per Time Period of Simulated Policies
(With ToD Preference)
 
 $-
 $10,000.00
 $20,000.00
 $30,000.00
 $40,000.00
 $50,000.00
 $60,000.00
 $70,000.00
 $80,000.00
 $90,000.00
 $100,000.00
1 2 3 4 5
Cumulative Revenue per Time Period
PCMIP Static
Figure 4.3: Cumulative Revenue per Time Period of Simulated Policies (With ToD
Preference)
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4.4.2 Small Network Example: Fare Class Impact
This example was modeled off of the three-leg network example seen in Liu and
van Ryzin (2008) and Bront et al. (2009), seen in Figure 4.4. We considered multiple
factors for purchasing behavior, including price, itinerary, and direct versus indirect.
The sensitivity to price was set to βp = −0.003, again, representing a negative sensi-
tivity to price. The differences between markets were set to (AB,BC,AC) = (2, 1, 3),
while the effect of direct versus indirect was set to βIndirect = −3.5, implying a negative
utility associated with having intermediate stops. Under these values, the regression
equation would read
αkt = −0.003Ykt + 2IAB + IBC + 3IAC − 3.5IIndirect ,
∀k ∈ Kji, t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, (4.14)
where Ij represents the 0/1 selection for each market j, and IIndirect represents the
0/1 selection of indirect versus direct for a given ticket k. The purpose of Ij is to
account for different sensitivities across different markets. Simply put, Ij adjusts the
magnitude of αkt for each market so that every market isn’t constrained to have the
exact same utility under similar preferences. Note, though, that these values were
created for this example and do not represent the true effects of a system, but are
merely designed to show the use and quality of the PCMIP formulation.
A
B
C
Leg 2
Figure 4.4: Small Network Example - Adapted from Liu and van Ryzin (2008)
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The small network example was solved for five time units (i.e., T = 5), with
γ ∈ (1, 2, 3, 10, 25), representing a total of 41 customers entering the system. The
market arrival rates and no purchase utilities are defined in Table 4.8, while the
bounds and static prices can be found in Table A.6 in the Appendix. This network
was solved under multiple fare class assumptions, ranging from two fare classes up to
six fare classes. As more fare classes were added, the static prices of the additional fare
classes were evenly distributed around the static price of the two fare class example.
For instance, origin-destination path A-C has two prices under the two fare class
example of $1000 and $800. Expanding this to a three fare class example, path A-
C would now have three prices of $1000, $900, and $800. This same process was
repeated for all origin-destination paths and fare classes so that the CMIP had the
widest array of options for optimizing revenue. The goal of using multiple fare class
examples is to show that the gains of having more options for the CMIP are outclassed
by the flexibility of the PCMIP.
O&D Market Market Probability (λj) No-purchase Utility (vj)
AC 0.50 1.25
AB 0.25 2
BC 0.25 1
Table 4.8: Market Parameters for Small Network Example with Two Fare Classes
As seen from Table 4.9, the PCMIP outperforms the CMIP regardless of the
number of fare classes the CMIP considers. In the simplest case, with two fare classes,
the PCMIP outperforms the CMIP by 3.4%, while maintaining a similar network load
factor of 63% versus the CMIP’s 64%. These results highlight an important feature of
the PCMIP: additional fare classes don’t provide an opportunity for increased revenue
when both price and availability are being optimized. As expected, the PCMIP
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PCMIP
CMIP
Time Number of Fare Classes
Period Two Three Four Five Six
1 $398 $167 $176 $169 $173 $171
2 $293 $118 $123 $124 $123 $128
3 $554 $244 $250 $251 $250 $250
4 $1924 $2031 $1998 $2025 $2027 $2007
5 $5196 $5535 $5539 $5523 $5522 $5526
Total $8367 $8095 $8086 $8093 $8094 $8081
Table 4.9: Simulated Expected Revenue for a Selected Number of Fare Classes
represents an infinite number of fare classes since it is able to select an infinite number
of prices. This feature essentially eliminates the need for fare classes in development
of the data set, which is a common issue in traditional RM implementation where fare
classes for each ticket type have grown significantly over the years. The CMIP, on the
other hand, could show gains when adding fare classes, but in this example, under
the preference conditions stated, there isn’t an advantage to increasing the number
of fare classes.
4.4.3 Large Network Example: Implementation of Southwest Airlines Ticket
Attributes
In this example, we chose a large hub-and-spoke network and incorporated the
Southwest Airlines product classification for passenger preferences seen in Table 4.10,
reproduced from Chapter 3. The network, seen in Figure 4.5, contains eight legs
and 20 origin-destination markets, and is based on the network found in Liu and van
Ryzin (2008). Each leg has an identical capacity of 200, and the arrival rates for each
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market can be found in Table A.7 in the Appendix. We ran this example for a single
time unit (T = 1) and a γ = 2000, representing a total of 2000 customers introduced
to the system.
Ticket Wanna Get
Anytime
Business
Attribute Away Select
Refundable No Yes Yes
Transferable With Fees Yes Yes
Priority Boarding No No Yes
Priority Security Lane No No Yes
Loyalty Miles Regular Bonus Bonus
Free Bags 2 2 2
Complementary Drinks No No Yes
Table 4.10: Southwest Airlines Product Attributes (Southwest Airlines, 2016)
MIA
SAV
BOS
ATLLAX
Figure 4.5: Large Network Example - Adapted from Liu and van Ryzin (2008)
Passenger choice was modeled according to the Southwest Airlines product clas-
sification found on their website. We considered eight ticket attributes along with
three products, described in Table 4.11. As the table suggests, “Business Select” rep-
resents all ticket attributes, while “Anytime” and “Wanna Get Away” are made up
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of a subset of these ticket attributes. The regression coefficients used to develop the
probabilities of purchase are also indicated in Table 4.11, and represent a passengers
sensitivity to each ticket attribute. In addition to these attributes, we also considered
price sensitivity and set βp = −0.015, while the no-purchase utilities can be found in
Table A.7 in the Appendix.
Ticket Business
Anytime
Wanna Regression
Attributes Select Get Away Coefficient
Refundable X X 1
Reusable Funds X X X 2
Same Day Changes X X 1.5
Priority Boarding X 1
Priority Security Lane X 0.5
Two Free Checked Bags X X X 2
Complimentary Premium Drink X 0.5
Table 4.11: Southwest Ticket Definitions and Regression Coefficients for Large Net-
work Example
With these regression coefficients and the parameters of the network, we solved
the PCMIP and CMIP with a single fare class option, based on the price bounds seen
in Table A.8 in the Appendix. Again, the static price for the CMIP comes from the
midpoint between these price bounds. Both the PCMIP and CMIP were solved, and
in the form of an airline representation, the solutions for each model are displayed
in Table 4.12. As you can see, the solutions are quite different, including situations
where the PCMIP chooses to close a ticket type (ATL-MIA and MIA-ATL), whereas
the CMIP chooses to leave them open. Additionally, the pricing options are vastly
different, with the PCMIP dynamically setting prices to account for their negative
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utility.
Itinerary
PCMIP CMIP
Business
Anytime
Wanna Business
Anytime
Wanna
Select Get Away Select Get Away
ATL-BOS $379 $370 Sold Out $690 $315 Sold Out
ATL-LAX $445 $366 $340 $723 $405 $183
ATL-MIA $366 Sold Out Sold Out $632 $227 Sold Out
ALT-SAV $369 $346 Sold Out $685 $268 Sold Out
BOS-ATL $379 $370 Sold Out $690 $315 Sold Out
BOS-ATL-LAX $616 $500 $86 $1,058 $558 $250
BOS-ATL-MIA $471 $338 $217 $736 $404 $169
BOS-ATL-SAV $416 $271 $265 $708 $341 $133
LAX-ATL $445 $366 $340 $723 $405 $183
LAX-ATL-BOS $616 $500 $103 $1,058 $558 $250
LAX-ATL-MIA $836 $411 $100 $1,168 $623 $205
LAX-ATL-SAV $719 $475 $84 $1,110 $597 $237
MIA-ATL $366 Sold Out Sold Out $632 $227 Sold Out
MIA-ATL-BOS $471 $338 $200 $736 $404 $169
MIA-ATL-LAX $836 $411 $100 $1,168 $623 $205
MIA-ATL-SAV $591 $336 $128 $796 $463 $168
SAV-ATL $371 $368 Sold Out $685 $268 Sold Out
SAV-ATL-BOS $416 $266 $211 $708 $341 $133
SAV-ATL-LAX $719 $475 $91 $1,110 $597 $237
SAV-ATL-MIA $591 $336 $146 $796 $463 $168
Table 4.12: Solutions for the Large Network Example
In simulation, the PCMIP resulted in an expected revenue of $525,420, while the
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CMIP resulted in an expected revenue of $352,885. The difference between the two
models, a 48.9% increase in revenue, is primarily due to the flexibility of the PCMIP
and the use of any pricing structure bounded by the upper and lower bounds for each
ticket, whereas the CMIP must select ticket availability and is automatically forced to
pick a price based on that selection. In reality, though, airlines don’t use a single fare
class for pricing of their products. Generally, each product has multiple fare classes
within it, each with their own respective price ranges. To mimic this sort of system
and give the CMIP an opportunity to do better, we solved the CMIP under the same
network and preference parameters, but gave it the option of two, three, or four fare
classes. The prices for each of these fare classes were evenly distributed around the
original bounds to give the CMIP the best spread of options. The solutions to each
of these fare class options were simulated, and the results are tabulated in Table 4.13.
Metric PCMIP
CMIP
Number of Fare Classes
One Two Three Four
Expected Revenue $525,420 $352,885 $464,610 $498,865 $485,378
Standard Deviation $9890 $6401 $13,881 $12,833 $11,987
Coefficient of Variation 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Expected Traffic 1127 1162 1031 1113 1081
Network Load Factor 98% 97% 89% 95% 94%
Table 4.13: Large Network Example Simulation Results for Varying Number of Fare
Classes
As the table suggests, the PCMIP outperforms the CMIP in all situations, even
when adding more fare class options. Even when the CMIP generates its highest
expected revenue, with three fare class options per product, the PCMIP still outper-
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forms the CMIP by 5.3%. Despite this significant increase in revenue, the PCMIP
maintains a reasonable coefficient of variation and a higher load factor. Ultimately,
the PCMIP is better able to balance the preferences of each ticket as well as price,
resulting in a better mix of passengers while maintaining a high load factor and
maximizing revenue.
This example was constructed to show two things: the PCMIP can maintain its
edge in more complex networks and that we can model the business classification of
tickets easily. Although this example doesn’t portray a full network, it does take into
account competition for seats across different itineraries and it manages to include
different ticket attributes while solving the hub-and-spoke network. Under the South-
west Airlines product classification, the PCMIP consistently outperformed the CMIP
under multiple fare class options, and maintained similar coefficient of variances and
network load factors. In this example, the PCMIP dominates the CMIP in all as-
pects, again suggesting the decision of price is more important than the number of
fare classes to consider.
4.4.4 Expanded Large Network Example: Impact of Additional Competition
Although the large network example previously discussed provided results that
solidify the PCMIP’s ability to select price in a complex network, it lacks some key
factors in choice-based revenue management. For one, the competition between origin-
destination combinations is missing, considering there are no direct routes between
the spoke cities. Additionally, the flights within the network are arbitrarily timed,
implying time of day preference isn’t important when passengers select their tickets.
To expand on the original large network example, we have added four direct flights
(seen in Figure 4.6), with each additional leg having a capacity of 100 seats.
We also incorporated time of day preference into the expanded large network ex-
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LAX ATL
MIA
SAV
BOS
Figure 4.6: Expanded Large Network Example
ample. Any flight that has a later connection is considered to be an “early flight”,
as well as any direct flight between the spokes. For instance, all flights leaving LAX,
BOS, SAV, and MIA are early flights. Conversely, all flights leaving ATL are con-
sidered “late flights”, so that any issues with timings on connections are assumed
to be satisfied. Keeping all of the regression parameters from the previous example
the same, we set the sensitivity to early flights to 0.75, implying earlier flights have
a positive effect on purchasing behavior. The additional flights were given bounds
based on ticket type, governed by the Southwest Airlines product classification, and
are displayed in Table 4.14.
Itinerary Business Select Anytime Wanna Get Away
LAX-BOS $776-$2000 $651-$775 $0-$650
LAX-MIA $991-$1875 $601-$990 $0-$600
BOS-LAX $776-$2000 $651-$775 $0-$650
MIA-LAX $991-$1875 $601-$990 $0-$600
Table 4.14: Price Bounds on Additional Tickets
In solving this example, we considered three methodologies. First, we solved
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this example with the given parameters utilizing the PCMIP. Then, we solved this
example with the CMIP, under a single fare class offering. Since we expect the
PCMIP to consistently outperform the CMIP as it can select price, we also allowed
a post-CMIP price optimization method to improve on the CMIP’s original solution.
The post-CMIP Price Optimal solution forces the PCMIP to use the CMIP solution,
but allows the PCMIP to adjust prices. Essentially, we solved the PCMIP given the
CMIP’s solution for ticket availability, creating a two-step ticket availability and price
optimization approach. After solving this example with these methods, we simulated
the results of the PCMIP (Table A.9 in the Appendix), CMIP, and Post-CMIP Price
Optimal methods (Table 4.16), and found that the PCMIP outperforms both the
CMIP and Post-CMIP Price Optimal method, as seen in Table 4.15.
Metric PCMIP CMIP
Post-CMIP
Price Optimal
Expected Revenue $637,190 $494,489 $620,321
Standard Deviation $19,918 $23,843 $22,290
Coefficient of Variation 0.03 0.05 0.04
Expected Traffic 1288 1247 1322
Network Load Factor 81% 78% 81%
Table 4.15: Extended Large Network Example Simulation Results
As the table suggests, the gains in revenue are drastic when comparing the CMIP
solution to that of the PCMIP. The PCMIP outperforms the CMIP by 28.9%, showing
an increase in overall traffic and network load factor. In spite of the poor performance
of the CMIP compared to the PCMIP, utilizing the CMIP solution and selecting op-
timal prices shows a substantial gain in expected revenue. The Post-CMIP Price Op-
timal solution improves the CMIP expected revenue by 25.4%, while falling slightly
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below the PCMIP solution by 2.6%. Thus, under more competition, more flight op-
tions, and incorporating a time of day preference, the PCMIP outperforms the CMIP
even when the CMIP’s solution is optimized for price. Although the Post-CMIP
Price Optimal solution does considerably better, this suggests the two-step optimiza-
tion approach often incorporated in the airline industry is sub-optimal, considering
the decisions of ticket availability and pricing can be solved simultaneously without
adding fare class complexity.
It is clear that optimizing pricing decisions while simultaneously setting ticket
availability produces better results compared to static models, but the results of the
Post-CMIP Price Optimal method compared to that of the CMIP highlight the impact
of pricing sensitivities on network revenue management. We can see the importance
of pricing by paying attention to the differences in pricing decisions between the
two methods. Table 4.16 contains the ticket availability and prices for the CMIP and
Post-CMIP Price Optimal method that were simulated to achieve the results in Table
4.15. On average, the CMIP charges $122 more than the Post-CMIP Price Optimal
method, deterring customers from making purchases in certain markets. Due to this
reduced average price, the Post-CMIP Price Optimal method is able to accept more
passengers but not at the expense of revenue.
These results show the added difficulty in optimizing revenue with more complex
networks. As more competition and ticket preferences are added, the passengers have
more choices to choose from, thus increasing the variability of their choice process.
Nonetheless, the PCMIP was able to handle the added complexity better than the
static model, yielding a sizable increase in expected revenue. As more complexity is
added to the network in the form of competitive flight options, the PCMIP should
be able to handle the complex network and maintain its edge compared to the static
model, as seen in the diverse set of examples given.
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Itinerary
CMIP Post-CMIP Price Optimal
Business
Anytime
Wanna Business
Anytime
Wanna
Select Get Away Select Get Away
ATL-BOS $690 $314 Sold Out $493 $378 Sold Out
ATL-LAX $723 $405 Sold Out $457 $444 Sold Out
ATL-MIA $632 $227 Sold Out $388 $263 Sold Out
ATL-SAV $685 $268 Sold Out $461 $368 Sold Out
BOS-ATL $690 $314 Sold Out $517 $378 Sold Out
BOS-LAX $1,388 $713 $325 $776 $651 $233
BOS-ATL-LAX $1,058 $558 Sold Out $739 $615 Sold Out
BOS-ATL-MIA $736 $404 Sold Out $651 $470 Sold Out
BOS-ATL-SAV $708 $341 Sold Out $645 $415 Sold Out
LAX-ATL $723 $405 Sold Out $497 $444 Sold Out
LAX-BOS $1,388 $713 $325 $776 $651 $285
LAX-MIA $1,433 $796 $300 $991 $601 $298
LAX-ATL-BOS $1,058 $558 Sold Out $623 $615 Sold Out
LAX-ATL-MIA $1,168 $623 Sold Out $836 $412 Sold Out
LAX-ATL-SAV $1,110 $597 $237 $719 $475 $371
MIA-ATL $632 Sold Out Sold Out $508 Sold Out Sold Out
MIA-LAX $1,168 $796 $300 $836 $601 $309
MIA-ATL-BOS $736 $404 Sold Out $553 $470 Sold Out
MIA-ATL-LAX $1,168 $623 $205 $836 $411 $410
MIA-ATL-SAV $796 $463 Sold Out $591 $475 Sold Out
SAV-ATL $685 $268 Sold Out $488 $368 Sold Out
SAV-ATL-BOS $708 $341 Sold Out $611 $415 Sold Out
SAV-ATL-LAX $1,110 $597 $237 $719 $475 $414
SAV-ATL-MIA $796 $463 Sold Out $591 $520 Sold Out
Table 4.16: CMIP and Post-CMIP Price Optimal Solutions for the Expanded Large
Network Example
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4.5 Conclusion
The extensive use of fare classes in the airline industry has created a computa-
tionally difficult problem when managing inventory to maximize revenue. In this
chapter, we introduce a model that eliminates the need for fare classes, which op-
timizes ticket prices and availability for maximum revenue, creating a manageable
non-linear mixed integer program. The model considers sensitivities to many ticket
attributes in a multinomial logit model, including price and path, aligning it with the
popular discrete choice modeling found in the current revenue management literature.
Compared against a static model, the Price-dynamic Choice-based Mixed Inte-
ger Program shows significant gains in revenue while maintaining computational effi-
ciency. In the first example, a parallel network, the PCMIP consistently outperformed
the CMIP when price and time of day were the only considerations of passenger choice.
Even under situations where the two models converged to vastly different solutions,
the PCMIP’s decisions dominated those of the CMIP, yielding a 13% increase in ex-
pected revenue. With added complexity to the network, the PCMIP continued to
outperform the CMIP, as seen in the second example. In this example we considered
a situation where the CMIP was given a better opportunity to perform with added
fare classes, highlighting that the PCMIP doesn’t require this added complexity to
yield better revenue results.
A large network example was also considered, in two different situations. First, the
product classification of Southwest Airlines was applied to the PCMIP and CMIP, and
solved for a hub-and-spoke network. The results showed that, even under a complex
network with realistic ticket attributes, the PCMIP maintains its edge against a
traditional static RM model. This edge continued to hold, despite added fare classes
for the static model, a common practice in today’s industry. Expanding on the large
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network, competition was added into the network by introducing direct connections
between some of the spoke cities. Additionally, a time of day preference was added
to the example to introduce a more realistic setting of passenger choice. Under these
new additions, the PCMIP continued to dominate the CMIP as well as a post-CMIP
price optimal solution, yielding an average increase of 28.9% compared to the CMIP
and 2.7% compared to the post-CMIP price optimal solution. These results highlight
not only the quality of the PCMIP, but also the importance of pricing in revenue
management.
The PCMIP has the freedom to select price bounded by passenger preference,
while determining the availability of each ticket type and is not bounded by static
price assumptions found in traditional fare class-based models. Developing an algo-
rithm that integrates the structure into a search method could lead to a tractable
formulation for airline use, while the current formulation is easily solvable for moder-
ately sized networks. As the progression of revenue management has slowed, incorpo-
rating price into controlling seat inventory provides an avenue for future development,
potentially leading to airline implementation of choice-based models that incorporate
pricing decisions alongside ticket availability.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
Despite revenue management being researched for over 35 years, this dissertation pro-
vides impetus for continued research in the field of airline revenue management. The
need for easily implemented models that link important decisions such as ticket avail-
ability and price has created a dichotomous system between academic research and
industry practice. Centered around computationally complex models and assumption-
latent demand models, academic research in airline revenue management has become
highly theoretical with little practical use for the airlines. Industry models, on the
other hand, provide sub-optimal solutions, thanks to over-simplified demand assump-
tions and the use of quick-to-compute heuristics. This dissertation addresses this
gap, providing computationally efficient mathematical formulations and an easily im-
plementable dependent-demand framework that provides better solutions than tradi-
tional RM models.
The first model, introduced in Chapter 2, is a choice-based mixed integer program
(CMIP) that incorporates dependent demand through itinerary utilities. The CMIP
consistently outperformed industry standards such as the EMSR-b and network op-
timization techniques, as well as one of the more favored models, the Choice-based
Deterministic Linear Program (CDLP). Although the gains were smaller when com-
paring the CMIP to the CDLP, the reduction in problem size and overall complexity
allows for airlines to implement the CMIP, which is often a criticism of the CDLP.
The combination of revenue performance and the size of the formulation led to a
useful model for implementation, but turned the attention to the construction of the
demand model, itself.
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In Chapter 3, I formally define a multinomial logit (MNL) choice demand model
for airline use, taking into account everyday ticket attributes and price. Previous
revenue management models, including CMIP, failed to take into account the impor-
tance of price and other ticket attributes when generating the ticket utilities. The
equations defined in Chapter 3 remove static assumptions, such as price-independent
purchase utilities, allowing researchers to develop revenue management models that
can account for purchase behavior while optimizing ticket availability and price. This
MNL framework simplifies the process of modeling dependent demand, while main-
taining the complex nature of passenger purchase behavior. Once the framework had
been established, extending the CMIP from Chapter 2 into a price-sensitive model
followed naturally.
The final model, the price-dynamic choice-based mixed integer program (PCMIP),
integrated the demand model established in Chapter 3 into the CMIP. The PCMIP
proved to be quite effective, optimizing both ticket availability and price, eliminating
the need for complex fare class systems. The PCMIP outperformed all previous
models, including the CMIP, since it had the advantage of dynamically setting prices
in the deterministic environment. With more flexibility, the PCMIP was easily solved
on multiple examples, including real-world examples on networks larger than most
revenue management research, utilizing tickets characterized by Southwest Airlines
purchasing options. Despite being a mixed integer non-linear program, the compact
nature of the CMIP was leveraged in the PCMIP, leaving a compact formulation
with minimal integer solutions while optimizing prices. The union of price and ticket
availability optimization with a compact formulation resulted in a network revenue
management model with practical application.
The two models presented in this dissertation, along with the revenue management
dependent-demand framework, has the opportunity to drive revenue management re-
97
search and industry application towards an agreement on proper methodologies. Im-
plementing basic assumptions and eliminating the use of independent demand mod-
els and fare classes, this dissertation provides the groundwork in industry-applicable
revenue management models, without having to generate computationally complex
network formulations or make restrictive assumptions. Advancing the field of revenue
management into one where academics and practitioners can agree on methodologies
and computational complexity should provide many years of advancement in the field
of network revenue management and airline operations optimization.
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Product Legs Class Fare Product Legs Class Fare
1 1 H 1000 12 1 L 500
2 2 H 400 13 2 L 200
3 3 H 400 14 3 L 200
4 4 H 300 15 4 L 150
5 5 H 300 16 5 L 150
6 6 H 500 17 6 L 250
7 7 H 500 18 7 L 250
8 {2,4} H 600 19 {2,4} L 300
9 {3,5} H 600 20 {3,5} L 300
10 {2,6} H 700 21 {2,6} L 350
11 {3,7} H 700 22 {3,7} L 350
Table A.1: Product Definitions for the Small Network Instance - Adapted from Liu
and van Ryzin (2008)
Segment O-D Consideration Set Preference Vector Utility of No Purchase λt
1 A-B {1,8,9,12,19,20} (10,8,8,6,4,4) 1 0.08
2 A-B {1,8,9,12,19,20} (1,2,2,8,10,10) 5 0.20
3 A-H {2,3,13,14} (10,10,5,5) 1 0.05
4 A-H {2,3,13,14} (2,2,10,10) 5 0.20
5 H-B {4,5,15,16} (10,10,5,5) 1 0.10
6 H-B {4,5,15,16} (2,2,10,8) 5 0.15
7 H-C {6,7,17,18} (10,8,5,5) 1 0.02
8 H-C {6,7,17,18} (2,2,10,8) 5 0.05
9 A-C {10,11,21,22} (10,8,5,5) 1 0.02
10 A-C {10,11,21,22} (2,2,10,10) 5 0.04
Table A.2: Segment Definitions for the Small Network Instance - Adapted from Liu
and van Ryzin (2008)
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Market Itinerary Arrival Rate Preference Vector No Purchase Utility
SATBOS SATDFW1DFWBOS1 0.002 (1, 2, 3) 4
SATSEA SATDFW1DFWSEA1 0.005 (2, 2, 4) 5
SEAABQ SEADFW1DFWABQ1 0.002 (3, 3, 3) 8
SEAAUS SEADFW1DFWAUS1 0.002 (4, 4, 5) 10
SEADCA SEADFW1DFWDCA1 0.005 (3, 5, 7) 11
SEAJFK SEADFW1DFWJFK1 0.007 (1, 2, 3) 8
SEASAT SEADFW1DFWSAT1 0.002 (2, 3, 8) 10
SEASFO SEADFW1DFWSFO1 0.002 (1, 1, 5) 9
SFOABQ SFODFW1DFWABQ1 0.002 (3, 4, 8) 9
SFOAUS SFODFW1DFWAUS1 0.002 (2, 2, 7) 9
SFODCA SFODFW1DFWDCA1 0.002 (1, 1, 4) 11
SFOORD SFODFW1DFWORD1 0.005 (1, 2, 3) 5
SFOSAT SFODFW1DFWSAT1 0.005 (1, 1, 2) 4
Single Itinerary Markets
Table A.3: Consideration Sets and Utility Values for the Single Itineraries in the
Large Network Example
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Market Preference Vector No Purchase Utility
ABQAUS ABQDFW1DFWAUS1 ABQDFW2DFWAUS2 0.037 0.012 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 7
ABQBOS ABQDFW1DFWBOS1 ABQDFW2DFWBOS2 0.002 0.049 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 8
ABQDCA ABQDFW1DFWDCA1 ABQDFW2DFWDCA2 0.002 0.007 (1, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6) 9
ABQDFW ABQDFW1 ABQDFW2 0.005 0.005 (2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5) 7
ABQJFK ABQDFW1DFWJFK1 ABQDFW2DFWJFK2 0.01 0.01 (1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7) 9
ABQORD ABQDFW1DFWORD1 ABQDFW2DFWORD2 0.012 0.002 (2, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11) 12
ABQSAT ABQDFW1DFWSAT1 ABQDFW2DFWSAT2 0.002 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) 4
ABQSEA ABQDFW1DFWSEA1 ABQDFW2DFWSEA2 0.005 0.007 (1, 1, 1, 2, 4, 5) 9
ABQSFO ABQDFW1DFWSFO1 ABQDFW2DFWSFO2 0.002 0.005 (1, 3, 3, 4, 5, 6) 6
AUSABQ AUSDFW1DFWABQ1 AUSDFW2DFWABQ2 0.007 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 5
AUSBOS AUSDFW1DFWBOS1 AUSDFW2DFWBOS2 0.002 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 7
AUSDCA AUSDFW1DFWDCA1 AUSDFW2DFWDCA2 0.002 0.005 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 8
AUSDFW AUSDFW1 AUSDFW2 0.005 0.01 (1, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6) 9
AUSJFK AUSDFW1DFWJFK1 AUSDFW2DFWJFK2 0.005 0.005 (2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5) 7
AUSORD AUSDFW1DFWORD1 AUSDFW2DFWORD2 0.002 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7) 9
AUSSAT AUSDFW1DFWSAT1 AUSDFW2DFWSAT2 0.01 0.005 (2, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11) 12
AUSSEA AUSDFW1DFWSEA1 AUSDFW2DFWSEA2 0.002 0.005 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) 4
AUSSFO AUSDFW1DFWSFO1 AUSDFW2DFWSFO2 0.007 0.002 (1, 1, 1, 2, 4, 5) 9
BOSABQ BOSDFW1DFWABQ1 BOSDFW2DFWABQ2 0.005 0.002 (1, 3, 3, 4, 5, 6) 6
BOSAUS BOSDFW1DFWAUS1 BOSDFW2DFWAUS2 0.002 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 5
BOSDFW BOSDFW1 BOSDFW2 0.002 0.005 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 6
BOSJFK BOSDFW1DFWJFK1 BOSDFW2DFWJFK2 0.01 0.002 (1, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6) 9
BOSSAT BOSDFW1DFWSAT1 BOSDFW2DFWSAT2 0.002 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5) 5
BOSSEA BOSDFW1DFWSEA1 BOSDFW2DFWSEA2 0.005 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4) 4
DCAABQ DCADFW1DFWABQ1 DCADFW2DFWABQ2 0.002 0.005 (1, 3, 3, 4, 5, 6) 7
DCAAUS DCADFW1DFWAUS1 DCADFW2DFWAUS2 0.002 0.01 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) 5
DCAORD DCADFW1DFWORD1 DCADFW2DFWORD2 0.002 0.002 (1, 1, 4, 4, 6, 7) 8
DCASAT DCADFW1DFWSAT1 DCADFW2DFWSAT2 0.005 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5) 6
DCASEA DCADFW1DFWSEA1 DCADFW2DFWSEA2 0.002 0.002 (1, 1, 3, 3, 4, 4) 5
DCASFO DCADFW1DFWSFO1 DCADFW2DFWSFO2 0.005 0.002 (1, 1, 1, 2, 4, 5) 7
DFWABQ DFWABQ1 DFWABQ2 0.002 0.005 (1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5) 8
DFWAUS DFWAUS1 DFWAUS2 0.002 0.002 (1, 4, 4, 5, 8, 9) 10
DFWBOS DFWBOS1 DFWBOS2 0.005 0.005 (2, 2, 4, 5, 6, 6) 9
DFWJFK DFWJFK1 DFWJFK2 0.002 0.012 (1, 1, 3, 4, 4, 9) 9
DFWORD DFWORD1 DFWORD2 0.005 0.002 (1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4) 5
DFWSAT DFWSAT1 DFWSAT2 0.002 0.007 (1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4) 5
DFWSEA DFWSEA1 DFWSEA2 0.005 0.007 (1, 2, 2, 3, 6, 6) 10
DFWSFO DFWSFO1 DFWSFO2 0.01 0.005 (1, 3, 3, 5, 6, 6) 9
JFKABQ JFKDFW1DFWABQ1 JFKDFW2DFWABQ2 0.002 0.005 (1, 1, 3, 4, 5, 5) 9
JFKAUS JFKDFW1DFWAUS1 JFKDFW2DFWAUS2 0.005 0.01 (1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9) 10
JFKBOS JFKDFW1DFWBOS1 JFKDFW2DFWBOS2 0.002 0.005 (2, 2, 5, 6, 6, 7) 9
JFKORD JFKDFW1DFWORD1 JFKDFW2DFWORD2 0.005 0.005 (1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5) 7
JFKSAT JFKDFW1DFWSAT1 JFKDFW2DFWSAT2 0.002 0.005 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5) 6
JFKSEA JFKDFW1DFWSEA1 JFKDFW2DFWSEA2 0.005 0.01 (1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 5) 5
ORDABQ ORDDFW1DFWABQ1 ORDDFW2DFWABQ2 0.002 0.005 (1, 2, 5, 5, 8, 9) 10
ORDAUS ORDDFW1DFWAUS1 ORDDFW2DFWAUS2 0.005 0.01 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) 4
ORDBOS ORDBOS1 ORDDFW1DFWBOS1 0.01 0.012 (1, 1, 5, 5, 8, 9) 10
ORDDCA ORDDFW1DFWDCA1 ORDDFW2DFWDCA2 0.002 0.005 (2, 2, 4, 4, 6, 6) 8
ORDDFW ORDDFW1 ORDDFW2 0.002 0.01 (1, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7) 8
ORDJFK ORDDFW1DFWJFK1 ORDDFW2DFWJFK2 0.007 0.005 (1, 4, 5, 5, 6, 6) 10
ORDSAT ORDDFW1DFWSAT1 ORDDFW2DFWSAT2 0.002 0.005 (1, 4, 4, 6, 10, 11) 12
ORDSEA ORDDFW1DFWSEA1 ORDSEA1 0.01 0.005 (1, 4, 3, 8, 5, 10) 11
ORDSFO ORDDFW1DFWSFO1 ORDDFW2DFWSFO2 0.01 0.002 (1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4) 5
SATABQ SATDFW1DFWABQ1 SATDFW2DFWABQ2 0.005 0.002 (2, 2, 4, 5, 5, 6) 9
SATAUS SATDFW1DFWAUS1 SATDFW2DFWAUS2 0.002 0.01 (1, 4, 4, 9, 10, 11) 15
SATDCA SATDFW1DFWDCA1 SATDFW2DFWDCA2 0.005 0.007 (2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 9) 9
SATDFW SATDFW1 SATDFW2 0.002 0.005 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3) 4
SATJFK SATDFW1DFWJFK1 SATDFW2DFWJFK2 0.007 0.002 (1, 1, 4, 4, 6, 7) 8
SATORD SATDFW1DFWORD1 SATDFW2DFWORD2 0.002 0.002 (3, 4, 8, 8, 10, 10) 15
SATSFO SATDFW1DFWSFO1 SATDFW2DFWSFO2 0.005 0.01 (1, 1, 4, 4, 9, 9) 10
SEABOS SEADFW1DFWBOS1 SEADFW2DFWBOS2 0.002 0.005 (1, 2, 2, 5, 5, 9) 10
SEADFW SEADFW1 SEADFW2 0.002 0.01 (1, 4, 4, 5, 9, 9) 4
SEAORD SEAORD1 SEADFW1DFWORD1 0.002 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 2, 4, 4) 3
SFODFW SFODFW1 SFODFW2 0.002 0.005 (1, 1, 3, 3, 4, 5) 2
SFOJFK SFODFW1DFWJFK1 SFOJFK1 0.005 0.002 (1, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7) 10
SFOSEA SFODFW1DFWSEA1 SFODFW2DFWSEA2 0.002 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) 7
Double Itinerary Markets
Itinerary Arrival Rate
Table A.4: Consideration Sets and Utility Values for the Double Itineraries in the
Large Network Example
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Market Preference Vector No Purchase Utility
BOSDCA BOSDCA1 BOSDFW1DFWDCA1 BOSDFW2DFWDCA2 0.002 0.005 0.002 (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5) 7
BOSORD BOSORD1 BOSDFW1DFWORD1 BOSDFW2DFWORD2 0.005 0.002 0.012 (1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6, 7) 7
BOSSFO BOSDFW1DFWSFO1 BOSDFW2DFWSFO2 BOSSFO1 0.002 0.002 0.005 (1, 2, 4, 4, 7, 8, 9, 9, 10) 11
DCABOS DCADFW1DFWBOS1 DCADFW2DFWBOS2 DCABOS1 0.024 0.027 0.049 (1, 1, 2, 4, 4, 5, 6, 6, 9) 9
DCADFW DCADFW1 DCADFW2 DCABOS1BOSDFW2 0.002 0.005 0.01 (2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9) 9
DCAJFK DCADFW1DFWJFK1 DCADFW2DFWJFK2 DCAJFK1 0.005 0.005 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) 8
DFWDCA DFWDCA1 DFWDCA2 DFWBOS1BOSDCA1 0.002 0.01 0.017 (1, 3, 3, 6, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) 12
JFKDCA JFKDFW1DFWDCA1 JFKDFW2DFWDCA2 JFKDCA1 0.005 0.005 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) 8
JFKDFW JFKDFW1 JFKDFW2 JFKDCA1DCADFW2 0.002 0.005 0.002 (1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 7, 7, 8) 8
JFKSFO JFKDFW1DFWSFO1 JFKDFW2DFWSFO2 JFKSFO1 0.002 0.005 0.002 (1, 3, 3, 4, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9) 9
SFOBOS SFOBOS1 SFODFW1DFWBOS1 SFODFW2DFWBOS2 0.002 0.005 0.007 (1, 1, 1, 5, 5, 5, 8, 8, 8) 3
Triple Itinerary Markets
Itinerary Arrival Rate
Table A.5: Consideration Sets and Utility Values for the Triple Itineraries in the
Large Network Example
Origin-Dest. Lower Static Upper
Product Path Class Bound Price Bound
1 A - C A $1000 $1200 ∞
2 A - B - C A $650 $800 ∞
3 A - B A $400 $500 ∞
4 B - C A $400 $500 ∞
5 A - C B $0 $800 $999
6 A - B - C B $0 $500 $649
7 A - B B $0 $300 $399
8 B - C B $0 $300 $399
Table A.6: Ticket Prices and Bounds for Small Network Example with Two Fare
Classes
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Market Arrival Rate (λj) No-purchase utility (vj)
ATLBOS 0.058 1
ATLLAX 0.058 1
ATLMIA 0.054 1
ATLSAV 0.046 1.5
BOSATL 0.058 1
BOSLAX 0.048 2
BOSMIA 0.044 1
BOSSAV 0.052 1
LAXATL 0.058 1
LAXBOS 0.048 1
LAXMIA 0.046 1.4
LAXSAV 0.053 1
MIAATL 0.054 1.2
MIABOS 0.044 1
MIALAX 0.046 1.5
MIASAV 0.040 1
SAVATL 0.046 2
SAVBOS 0.052 1
SAVLAX 0.053 1.1
Table A.7: Arrival Rates and No-purchase Utilities for Large Network Example
Itinerary Business Select Anytime Wanna Get Away
ATL-BOS $379-$1000 $250-$378 $0-$249
ATL-LAX $445-$1000 $366-$444 $0-$365
ATL-MIA $264-$1000 $190-$263 $0-$262
ATL-SAV $369-$1000 $168-$368 $0-$167
BOS-ATL $379-$1000 $250-$378 $0-$249
BOS-ATL-LAX $616-$1500 $500-$615 $0-$499
BOS-ATL-MIA $471-$1000 $338-$470 $0-$337
BOS-ATL-SAV $416-$1000 $266-$415 $0-$265
LAX-ATL $445-$1000 $366-$444 $0-$365
LAX-ATL-BOS $616-$1500 $500-$615 $0-$499
LAX-ATL-MIA $836-$1500 $411-$835 $0-$410
LAX-ATL-SAV $719-$1500 $475-$718 $0-$474
MIA-ATL $264-$1000 $190-$263 $0-$262
MIA-ATL-BOS $471-$1000 $338-$470 $0-$337
MIA-ATL-LAX $836-$1500 $411-$835 $0-$410
MIA-ATL-SAV $591-$1000 $336-$590 $0-$335
SAV-ATL $369-$1000 $168-$368 $0-$167
SAV-ATL-BOS $416-$1000 $266-$415 $0-$265
SAV-ATL-LAX $719-$1500 $475-$718 $0-$474
SAV-ATL-MIA $591-$1000 $336-$590 $0-$335
Table A.8: Bounds on Prices for Large Network Example
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Itinerary
PCMIP
Business
Anytime
Wanna
Select Get Away
ATL-BOS $503 Sold Out Sold Out
ATL-LAX $457 $444 Sold Out
ATL-MIA $472 Sold Out Sold Out
ATL-SAV $454 Sold Out Sold Out
BOS-ATL $540 Sold Out Sold Out
BOS-LAX $776 $651 $247
BOS-ATL-LAX $616 $510 Sold Out
BOS-ATL-MIA $538 Sold Out Sold Out
BOS-ATL-SAV $547 Sold Out Sold Out
LAX-ATL $497 $444 Sold Out
LAX-BOS $776 $651 $296
LAX-MIA $991 $601 $295
LAX-ATL-BOS $616 $558 Sold Out
LAX-ATL-MIA $836 $442 Sold Out
LAX-ATL-SAV $719 $475 $322
MIA-ATL $513 Sold Out Sold Out
MIA-LAX $991 $601 $294
MIA-ATL-BOS $553 $470 Sold Out
MIA-ATL-LAX $836 $425 Sold Out
MIA-ATL-SAV $591 $448 Sold Out
SAV-ATL $512 Sold Out Sold Out
SAV-ATL-BOS $513 Sold Out Sold Out
SAV-ATL-LAX $719 $475 Sold Out
SAV-ATL-MIA $591 $454 Sold Out
Table A.9: PCMIP Solution for the Expanded Large Network Example
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